(Institute of Oriental Studies, RAS, Russia) Mehdi Imanipour (OCIR, Iran) Shigeru Kamada (University of Tokyo, Japan) Seyyed 1996. Bonmariage, C., “How is it possible to see ghouls in the desert?,” in: S. Gh. Safavi (ed.)


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Nauka Vostochnaya Literatura      :         : 2015.  6 = Ishraq : Islamic Philosophy Yearbook : 2015. No. 6. . :            ()    20     ,        ,          !       The sixth issue of the yearbook of Isla mic philosophy Ishraq (Illumination) contains more than twenty articles in Russi an, English and French, devoted to a wide range of issues, current in Islamic ph 464   (       ....................................................................................... 9 From the Editor .................................................................................................... 10               ............................ 11 ............................................ 28 ) ................................................................... 40 ) ............................................. 71 Approach .................................................................... 236 of Monotheism ............................................................................................... 251 sitant Rationalist .................................... 264 hilosophy ............................................................................ 273          (    )   -  ( ),          .   ! ,  ,  !  " !#,     $       %# -     # . &  ,  $          ,   "      -   (   '  !        '   ). &     !   ,  $     -  "    /   !           . *   $        - "    !      !    !  . + *     "   !,      &        ,    ! - 0          !,       -         ,      - &     % ,  !        -  XVIIIXX .,      2    $ -    $    2        - * %       , 3     456, 3        8     !-  2%  %% #  !       - The central theme of the sixth issue, as it was announced earlier, is the Tran- scendent Philosophy of Sadr al-Din Shirazi (Mulla Sadra)approximately, half of the materials are devoted to it. We are very happy that almost a dozen of ex- perts on Sadra have kindly contributed articles dealing with different aspects of his thought. In addition, the issue includes two translations of Sadras texts (a chapter from the Wisdom of the Throne , in Rus- sian, and a short treatise Provision for a Traveller ). Further- more, several articles deal with the general aspects of the later phase of the School of Isfahan and/or some of its representativesas a rule, either students of Sadra or his opponents. Since it is almost impossible to consider these think- ers outside the context of Transcendent Ph ilosophy, we decided to include the aforementioned articles in the same section. Thus, the first section comprises losophy of Religion form the second section, which is followed by the third sec-                   -           ,     -    ,        ,  -                 !-   . " # $         -     . %  &  -" '        -       ,          -                      -   (       )   .. !- -     (2-  ., ", 1378 ../1999), #       $ ,  %!      -         :  ,          [       ],         [       ],      & - !-'* . $ . + .  . 0  , . . ! .            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A #  ,   ,   -   ,     / ,              ,    ,  . &  -  *& A        ,      ,              "    , ,    ' !,   "   ",   " ,        ,    . A $ *    : 8   !  ,  $   ,        " ,     !!     ,   . $!   #  - *& On his full name, see the incipit to his , MS Tehran University Cen- tral Library 448, mentioned in Ibrhm Dbj, Avl u s r-i Mull Shams Gln ba-inimm-i Risla f taqq man l-kull, in M. Mohaghegh & T. Izutsu (eds.), , Tehran: McGill Institute of Islamic Studies, 1971, 5396; who was also a student of Mr Dmd and took his tradition to India. Not much is known about his whereabouts. He di Iskandar B g, , ed. raj Afshr, Tehran: Inti shrt-i i ilt, 1350 Sh./ 1971, I, 14647; Taq al-Dn Awad Balyn, , ed. Sayyid Musin Nj Narbd, Tehran: In tishrt-i As r, 1388 Sh./2009, I, 591 96; Mrz Abdullh Afand, , ed. Sayyid Amad u- sayn, Qum: Kitbkhna-yi yatullh Ma rash, 1981, V, 4044; Henry Corbin, , Tehran: Intishrt-i As r, 1389 Sh./2 010, 3942; Sayyid Muammad Al Mudarris , I, 591; Jahnbakhsh, , 2224. On philoso- phy in Shiraz, see Reza Pourjavady, , Leiden: Brill, 2011, and Ahab Bdaiwi, Sajjad Rizvi came the Shaykh al-Islm of Isfahan, and died in 1040/1631 whilst accompany- Mr Dmd had a number of significant students both in the transmission of and in philosophical training. In the latter category one finds Mull adr Shrz (d. 1045/1635), a pre-eminent thin ker of the Safavid period who rejected Al- urr al- mil, , ed. Sayyid Amad usayn, Najaf: al-Ma baa al- aydarya, 1965, II, 252; Muammad Taq Astarbd, , ed. M.T. D- Mrz Raf al-Dn Muammad ab ab, , ed. Abdul- , 96115; amd A  Naar, Mr Dmd, , ed. mid Nj, Tehran: Muassasa-yi The question of where Mr D md himself stood on the issue of the ontological priority of existence or essence is not so straightforward. Broadly, it is statedand following his student Mull adr who accused him of it -i maktb, 1374 Sh./1995, 79). However, he does not shy away from affirming existence fo r God as primary, nor does he deny that existence of an object is identical to its very actuality (i.e. mo re than a concept in the form of his students, we see the whole range of philosophical tendencies in the later Safavid period from the more mystical to the Avicennan, from the il- In particular, for the transmission of his ideas and glosses on his works, the most important figures were Sayyid Nim al-Dn Amad Alaw mil (d. before 1060/1651), his cousin ( Qub al-Dn influential history of philosophy Nim al-Dn Amad G- ln (d. after 1071/1660), a major figure in the transmission of science to the Deccan, who also continued Mr Dmds position on creation in his own trea- and our Shams al-Dn Muammad Gln known Qu b al-Dn Ashkivar, , eds. mid idq and Ibrhm Dbj, 2 vols., Nim al-Dn Amad Gln, Ab Nar Frb, , ed. Al Awjab, Tehran: Anjuman-i Al-qul b. Qarajghy Khn, , ed. F ima Fan, 2 vols., Tehran: Mrs 1972, II, 353; q Buzurg ihrn, , Najaf: al-Ma baa al- Sajjad Rizvi Muammad, whom he mentions in his , was probably also a Mull Shams had a philosophical correspondence with Mull adr. He i) Which categories undergo motion? He copied his teachers a copy is extant in MS Tehran University Cen- Attested in the MS Tehran University C entral Library 2062 autograph copy of the Mull adr, , ed. Sayyid usayn Msavyn, Tehran: Bun- Mrz Bghnaw Shrz, , Qum: Majma-yi zakhir-i 6) a gloss on the of Maybud which was rather popular as an of figures in the circle of Mr Dmd 7) a gloss on Khafrs gloss on the sec tion on proof for the existence of God 8) a gloss entitled the on Mr Ghiyth al-Dn Dash- 9) and a gloss on the For the original, see Shams al-Dn Khafr, On Ibn Kammnas objection to the proof for a single Necessary Existence ( ), see Reza Pourjavady & Sabine Schmidtke, Sajjad Rizvi and on the ontological mode of Whatever happened to the school of Isfahan? Philosophy in 18 century Iran, in Mi- chael Axworthy (ed.), the Mutazil denial of the attributes neither nominalism, nor realism. Third, affirming the reality of divine knowledge, partly motivated by the need to establish how God knows particu- lars, by arguing that neither the Avicennan theory of representation by which God knows particulars in a universal s ense, nor the illuminationist/adrian posi- tion whereby God knows particulars by their presence to him are correct. As the text was written after the , he refers back to his argument on this issue in that text and his critique of Mull adr. The third chapter takes up most of the space and is quite a sophisticated critique of the Avicennan tradition, citing the Sajjad Rizvi ier and philosopher-theologian Mr Muammad Bqir Dmd. Creationism, the idea that the cosmos came about as a result of the work of some intelligent arti- David Sedley, , Berkeley: University of Califor- Proclus arguments followed a reading of the that distinguished the cosmos logical posteriority to the One from its temporal consequence; thus many of the points relate to the absurdity of a time before ti me (e.g., argument 5) or to rather Aristotelian arguments from motion, generation and corruption. Philo- argument against a circular series (intraver sability) and an infinite chain of natu- Cf. Herbert Davidson, Sajjad Rizvi nite time. It seems that their concernperhaps akin to Philoponuswas to defend the uniqueness and incomparable transcendence of God. Nevertheless, with the advent of the philosophical traditions in Islam, one can discern a shift from the paradigm of a volitional, creator God who creates with a purpose and who creates out of nothing ( Afal al-Dn Ibn Ghayln, , ed. Mahd Muaqqiq, Tehran: McGill In- Nar al-Din s, , ed. Abbs Muammad asan Sulaymn, Cairo: Mr Dmd, , ed. Abdullh Nrn, Tehran: Sajjad Rizvi adherence to the school of Ibn Arab than did the master himself. He consid- ered all previous schools of thought (Peri Mr Dmd, , ed. Al Awjab, Tehran: Mrs -i maktb, 1380 Mr Dmd, He clearly thought that those who had written before him on the issue of creation and time, including Avicenna, ha d failed to convince, and he felt that he could produce a more robust argument and base his Yemeni philosophy on gisms and divine inspirations, it appears that incipience has three possible mean- ings: The first of them is the priority of the existence of a thing by essential non- existence and this is called, according to the philosophers, essential creation ) []. The second of them is the priority of a thing by its non- Sajjad Rizvi (Exemplars of the Sciences) revived the debate on the beginning of the world and hence led to the Safavid responses. The totality of the section on principles of faiththe longest section of the textis taken up with the question of the incipience of the cosmos; contrary to the philosophers Jall al-Dn Davn, Anmdhaj al-ulm, in , ed. Sayyid Amad , 6263, 128. Within Iran alone there are over 50 copies of the . Davns line of students who wrote on this topic within a text entitled the included Muli al-Dn Lr (d. 979/1572, e.g., MS Damad Ibrahim Paa/Suleymaniye 791, 796ff. ), Mrz-jn Bghnav Shrz (d. 994/1586, e.g., MS Madrasa-yi Khn Marv Tehran 800, 807ff.), and Muammad b. al- asan Shrvn (d. 1098/1687, e.g., MS Tehran University C entral Library 7162, fol. 68v89v). Other authors with works on the same title that criticised D avns position following Dashtak (and perhaps fahn (d. 991/1583, e.g., MS Kitbkhna-yi Malik, 2783, fol. 3v33v), Muizz al-Dn Muammad b. Fakhr al-Dn Mashhad (fl. 1096/1685, e.g., MS Kitbkhna-yi Khn Marv 800, 802ff.), and Isml b. Muammad Bqir Khtnbd (d. 1116/1704, e.g., MS Kitbkh na-yi Majlis-i Shr 3453). The codex MS Ki- tbkhna-yi Khn Marv 800 seems to be a particularly valuable co llection of treatises entitled Firouzeh Saatchian, and in his treatise he devotes a large section to the discussion of divine creative agency in terms of understanding how the cosmos is created by God as well as ) to create. His main concern is to demonstrate the no- albeit on the basis of the Avicennan argument for God as the necessary of exis- Ab-l- asan Kshn, , ed. Zuhra Qurbn, Tehran: Muassasa-yi Sajjad Rizvi the investigation of them. The eighth is the knowledge of the continuity of mo- What is clear from this list is that this is very much an Avicennan formula- Sayyid Amad al- mil al-Alaw, , ed. mid Nj Ifahn, Sajjad Rizvi Mr Dmd then draws upon a number of texts proving his tripartite division of temporality, beginning with passages from Avicenna. First, he cites the pas- sage below from that comprises a series of notes addressing ques- tions brought to Avicennas attention by his students concerning issues in his Mr Dmd, , ed. Sayyid usayn Musavyn, Tehran: Muassasa-yi pahish-yi ikmat u falsafa-yi rn, 1391 Sh./2013, 421 Mr Dmd, , 89; cf. Avicenna, Avicenna, Sajjad Rizvi Mr Dmd, , 10; cf. Bahmanyr, , ed. M. Mu ahhar, simultaneous whole. The temporality, but also most significantly pos its the possibility of a human soul to traverse these levels. In the headings of topics ( , kefalaia) pro- vided in the introduction to the text, th e author argues that every intelligible entity is timeless because intelligibles pr Mr Dmd, , 11; cf. Aris  [Afl n], Uthljiy: Theologia Aristotelis, 11. 80 Mr Dmd, , 1112; cf. Aris  [Afl n], Mr Dmd, , 1213; cf. Aris  [Afl n], Mr Dmd, , 1314; cf. Aris  [Afl n], Sajjad Rizvi the definitions of time and motion, working against both the Aristotelian and Avicennan traditions, as he does in Qabas VI. His main attempt in five argu- posterior to God because all that exi Mr Dmd, , 7576; cf. Sad Naar Tavakkul, Sad Naar, , Mashhad: Bunyd-i Mr Dmd, , ed. Al Awjab, Tehran: Mrs -i maktb, 1376 Sh./1997, Sajjad Rizvi, Mr Dmd in India: Islami c philosophical traditi ons and the problem of Sajjad Rizvi to some of his student Mull adrs positions, including the refutation of his position on motion in substance and on the modulatory, intensifying nature of After the ontological propaedeutics, a large section (the sixth) deals Mr Dmd, , ed. mid Nj Ifahn, Tehran: Mrs -i maktb, 1391 Sh./ shtiyn and Corbin (eds.), , I, 465493; Corbin, , 140150. Al-Ri Aghars critical edition of the text that is based on the following four manuscripts: MS Tehran University Central Library 9108 dating century AH/18 century CE, MS Majlis-i Shr-yi Islm (Tehran) 11520 dated 1052/1642, MS Kitbkhna-yi Malik (Tehran) 1671 dated 1061/1650, and MS Kitbkhna-yi know from Mull adrs own testimony that he had sent a copy of his work to Mull Shams begins in the proemium ( ) by stating that his argu- mentsbeing discerned and not learnt an Sajjad Rizvi immediate, presential knowledge ( ), arguing that contingents can only have formal and representational knowledge ( ) of objects extrinsic He then moves onto Mr Dmds decoupling of temporality and motion and refuting the notion of unreal time. This section deals with an objection raised He then refutes them drawing upon Philoponusas we saw above whose arguments were known at least since the time of the Kind circle. The Nashr-i nuq a, 1379 Sh./2000, 86; Muamm ad b. Abd al-Karm al-Shahrastn, Mull adr, Sajjad Rizvi in this. It would seem therefore that Mull Shams himself is not an at least on this point, nor does he have sympathy with the views of Ibn Arabs Sheldon Pollock, Introductio n, to Sheldon Pollock (ed.), Among others, Talal Asad, , Baltimore: Johns Hokpins University Press, 1993; Brent Nongbri, , New Haven: Yale University Press, 2013; disagreement about the very nature of European modernitymost famously articulated by Bruno Latourdemands this scrutiny. Variegated traditions and the search for different cosmopoles and postcolonies across space and time are increasingly our collective endeavour in the humanities. The prolif- eration of vernacular literary cultures and the need to focus beyond the canon, beyond what the colonials defined as text s to be edited and then of course trans- The context indicates the nature of the tradition and its practices. Instead of focusing on a narrow canon of the master bas e texts, one needs to consider the contribution of those who, from our perspective, might be minor figures but were in their time considered to be major thinkers, philosophers and commenta- Bruno Latour, , Paris: La Dcouverte, 1991, and more recently idem, Paris: La Dcouverte, 2012; cf. Sudipta Kavira j, Outline of a revisionist theory of moder- Sajjad Rizvi fact did the jobs which philosophers are popularly supposed to doimpelling social reform, supplying new vocabularies for moral deliberation, deflecting the The aim is not to create a new canon or to engage in a doxographical exer- cise but to focus on the nature of the practice of philosophy which, as specialists in Islamic thought have indicated, rests upon commentary traditions. It is thus often through the commentators and similar minor figures that we can truly make sense of what, for example, was the Avicennan tradition of the 17 cen- tury, how texts were studied, which parts were scrutinised and glossed and how they were used to make sense of the intellectual preoccupations of their practi- tioners. Reconstruction for its own sake or what might be termed antiquarian- ismis not the purpose, even if earlier effo rts to trace the intellectual history of the period from, say, 1500 to 1900 did little else but give a list of names, texts, and some ideas in their particularities that seem quite incommensurable to our This is a short treatise by Mull Sadr in which he gives twelve principles of For the Arabic text of this treatise, see S.J. shtiyn, Mad jismn: Sharh bar zd al , (Tehran: Anjuman-e Islm Hikmat va Falsafe-e Iran, 1359 H.S.), Latimah-Parvin Peerwani of gnosis and spiritual unveiling, and mediators to the threshold of divine And then: The lowest in connecting to the strong rope of the God, Muham- mad Ibrhim, known as Sadr al-Dn Shirz, says: I intend to mention in this the issue of bodily resurrection which has baffled the power of reflection of schol- ars to give demonstrative proofs about it. This issue has incapacitated the minds of learned scholars to have faith in it excep t on the basis of transmitted [religious] sciences. The utmost level of investigat ion on the above issue that they have reached is based on the [literal] language The word gnosis, which is the translation of does not refer to the Gnostic tradi- tion, and realization of divine knowledge, attained through such practices as contemplation, reflection, inner purification and moral refi nement and not through demonstrative arguments Quiddity here means in a particular sense, i.e., that which is given in answer to inherent [properties] and affairs of the indi vidual identity; they continue to exist not identically, but as substitutes by w ay of substitution. Now, each one of them is an accident from one limit to [another] limit, like the accident of temperament, Latimah-Parvin Peerwani united with it, existent by its existence in a subtler, simpler mode, and more per- Vision does not occur by the impression of image from the I have dealt with these views quite elaboratel y, see my article Mull Sadr on Imagina- tive Perception and Imaginal World in vol. 1, no. 2, September, Latimah-Parvin Peerwani information concerning the people of Paradise, An angel comes to them. He tialization], until there actualizes for him another engendered being, which is soul-hood. It has psychic parts, and he is the second Man. Then he transmutes in For its explication, see Mull Sadr Shrz, , vol. 8, ed. by Ali Akbar Rashshd, (Tehran: Bunyad-i Hikmat-i Islami-yi Mull Sadr, 1383/2005) , p. 121, and Mulla Spiritual Psychology , trans. of volumes eight and nine of of Mulla Sadra by Badaw, Abd al-Rahmn, Afltn inda al-Arab , third edition, (Kuwait: Wiklat al- its natural body made of the character-traits and psychic dispositions acquired during the souls connection with the natural body. So what occurs to human soul is the second birth, and what result s from it by accident is the passing away of the first mode of life by death. Hence, the death occurs to the accident [i.e., the corporeal body] and not to the essence [or the soul], otherwise there would not be any direction for the human soul for its journeying if non-existence were natural for it. Thus all things direct themselves towards perfection, traveling Latimah-Parvin Peerwani that other species than human arrive at the divine Presence by journeying rap- idly, then it must first arrive at the human level by essence and then, from it, to the sacred presence, because human reality is the threshold of God, which needs In sum, a human individual, from the time when he is engendered, is [in the process of] existential renewal [19] and substantial intensity, and is innately directed to the next world, and then to the Sacred Presence. Albeit, due to this nsity, he arrives at some limit of [his existence], and thereby separates from this worldly natural body, becomes inde- pendent of it, suffices by his essence with out having the need of what dissipates vicinity of God, and cannot become worthy of the station of a servant [of God]. So, death is the first way-station of the next world and the final level of this world. It is like an isthmus ( This matter is the most important degree in [spiritual] sciences, and has a great importance, and is very subtle in procedure. I have spent a great part of my writing, or hearing and observation. This light of faith is the blessing of God, which He bestows upon the one whom He wills. God is the possessor of bless- Latimah-Parvin Peerwani Mull Sadr, tence is ship of is described by Sadra as follows: The existence is that which is receptive to intensity and weakness. It means it is receptive to in- tensive movement. The substance in its substantiality, that is, its substantial ex- istent, is receptive to essential transformation the parts of motion are con- tiguous, that is, its limits are not existe nt in actuality in the manner of being dis- In the fifth and sixth principles, Sadrs emphasis is on the soul being the principle and immortal, and on the corporea l body being subject to change and The human soul in its being is from the root of the talizing unity, which is a shadow of the Divine unity. In its own essence, it is intellective, imaginative and sensible , growing and moving, and it is a nature flowing in the body, as the philosopher [Aristotle/Plotinus] said, because it pos- Latimah-Parvin Peerwani umes of the such as soul being the spark of Divine Light or Existence ( ), its three levels, sensory, imaginativ using the bodily organs. So its disposal in the particular body is not pointless, rather it is for the sublime wisdom which only God and those who are well- The twelfth principle is about the death of the corporeal natural body and the post-mortem destiny of the soul, which Sadr expounds in depth in his When the soul becomes more powerful, says Sadr, the body in which it dis- poses becomes weaker in power and more imperfect in existence; when it be- comes assiduous in power, life and perfection, the body becomes assiduous in For an elaborate discussion on this issue, see: Yanis Eshots, Pre-existence of Souls to Bodies in Sadras philosophy, in , vol. 3, no. 2, June, 2002; and my paper Mind-Body relationship according to Mulla Sadra, in , papers presented at the Second World Congress on Mulla Sadra (Tehran: Mull Sadr, , vol. 9, edited by R. Akbarian, op. cit., p. 334, Spiritual Psychology is not intended the body which the physicians call animate pneuma, which is created in the animal having flesh fr om the blood in the heart and liver, and which flows in the body through the coronary [blood] vessels, because that is a envelope of the soul, which is independent of the physical body, a subtle or imaginal body of the soul, woven out of mans actions. It is identical to the physical body in form. When the soul, em- bodied in the imaginal or subtle body, leaves its corporeal body at death, says Sadr, the dead person in the subtle body sees his earthly material body being buried in the grave. The soul in its su btle body perceives the pains or bliss oc- curring to it in the grave as sharply or perhaps more than the sensory tortures or bliss, as recorded in the true Divine Revelation, but this torture or bliss occurs to the soul in its subtle body. This is the punishment or bliss in the grave. So the real grave is these dispositions [or forms] acquired by the soul, which are in- grained in its imaginative faculty, and the reward and punishment in the grave , edited by A.M. Shkir (Cairo: al-Maktabat al-Islmiyya, 1938), Latimah-Parvin Peerwani Further Sadr says: The dead body may be lying [on the ground], it may be in the air, in the water, in some very narrow place, or [its] parts scattered by the The soul after leaving its natural body continues its journey in another world, called the inter-world ( ), which Sadr mentions in passing in The traditional hierarchy of being in the Transcendent philosophy of Mull Sadr consists of a triple universe: the sensible physical world, the supra- sensible Intermediate World of the Soul (or ), also called the Imaginal World, and the world of pure Intelligences or Spirits or angels. God, who is pure Being or Existence, is above these levels. To these three universes, there corre- sponds the anthropological triad, body- of knowledge are: physical senses, imagination, and intellect. Sadras transcen- dent philosophy is based on his doctrine of trans-substantial motion of existence. The terrestrial or corporeal existence of the soul through this motion goes Mull Sadr, Sharh usl al-kf (Tehran: Muassisa-yi mutlat wa without physical matter. So it is a not imaginary). Some are jinn and devils. These are the inhabitants of this Inter-world, and they are spirits in subtle bodies, which have shape, color, form, extension, movement, memory, cognition and consciousness, but no physical matter and its solidity. This is the world, says Mull Sadr, whose existence has been vouchsafed by the ancient philosophers and gnostics, such as Empedocles, Pythagoras, Socrates, Plato, and others, and all the spiritual travelers in different communities. I am among those, says he, who have conviction in the existence of the Imaginal [or Intermediate] World, as the pillars of Philosophy and intu itive people have established and as re- ported by Suhraward. But it is not the world of Platonic Ideas, for the latter are stable entities of luminous Intellects, whereas the Forms of the Inter-world are in suspense. Some of them have no light. They are darkness and they constitute Hell, an abode for the evil ones. Some have light, and they constitute Paradise, The soul in the body of resurrection or subtle body remains in the inter- world, which is its second emergent state after its growth in this material world. The consummation of the time of the inter-world, according to Sadr, marks the advent of the major resurrection, which cons ists in the transfer of the soul from the abode of the inter-world to the abode of the Reality ( ) in the body So, from Sadrs point, there are three basic levels of the body: gross, subtle and subtler; these bodies correspond to the three levels of human dream state and intellective state. The first level disintegrates at the physical death, the second level, when the major re surrection takes place, but the final level or intellective level of the soul an Mull Sadr, , vol. 1, ed. by Gulmrez Aavn (Tehran: Bunyd-i Hikmat-i Islmi-yi Mull Sadr, 1383/2005), p. 352; also Mull Sadrs glosses on the margins of the by Qutb al-Dn al-Shrzs lithograph edition (1313 A.H.), pp. 493, 509; his Tafsr al-Qurn al-Karm , edited by M. Khvju,(Qum, 1366 H.S.), vol. 1, p. 298; vol. 9, p. 248, Spiritual Psychology , p. 507; Latimah-Parvin Peerwani, The post- mortem states of the soul according to Mulla Sadra Shirazi (d. 1640) compared with Sweden- Latimah-Parvin Peerwani like a sound eye, illuminated by the light of the highest celestial kingdom. Then each of the organs of awareness becomes informed by the great signs from His Lord; it becomes a door, opening to the gnosis of His Exalted Lord, and he is able to abstract the universal intelli- gible meanings from the particular sensible forms, and understand from them der the same rubric and seem to represent different replies to a single question, these similarities, with regard to certain considerations, assume a differing The concept of existence in the West, which we seek to investigate in the present article, has been studied in a speci al context. Prior to analyzing that con- Hamidreza Ayatollahy text, we need to call attention to issues such as the role of epistemology in the generation of modern Western philosophy, the contemporary subjective attitude, dualism of subject and object, and the d ominant humanistic attitude in Western thought in the present era, for the ex istential attitude has developed within this historical background; in turn, in the context of Islamic philosophy, we encoun- ter a different background. For instance, in Sadraean philosophy, when discuss- The pivotal role of man and the historical approach to reality in Western Chris- tian culture play a significant role in explaining the meaning of existence; whereas in Islamic culture this role is assigned to the divine message and the spiritual journey towards God. Therefore, the concept should be studied in the The philosophical analysis of a concept may be carried out to achieve vari- ous ends, each of which dictates the application of a different explanatory ap- analysis is quite different from the analys is aiming at the investigation of the cle we do not seek to explore all argumentations and replies and come up with an analytical result, it seems that in spite of these obstacles and difficulties, we believe that comparative philosophy is s till possible. It is true that the above stacles, philosophical comparison is possible and even indispensable for the exchange of thoughts and views. However, concepts are extremely superficial and simplistic and, when comparing, we should seriously consider, as much as po ssible, the conditions of the evolution of a concept, its cultural contexts and the ends of philosophical explorations. Hamidreza Ayatollahy existentialism, inquire into the semantic explanation of the concept of existence, and elaborate on the main elements of this thought; then, in a similar way, we investigate the background of the concept in Islamic and Sadraean thought, end- Descartes, as the founder of modern Western philosophy, made the basis of his philosophy. Philo sophical explanation based on finally led to of being. What gains significance here, is man as the knowing agent, and the Cartesian I is the thinkers I and, according to Descartes, when he thinks, he exists. That is why Descartes is the founder of modern Western subjectivism. With Descartes, philosophical thought shifts to epistemology. The world is merely an object vis--vis Cartesian subject. Descartes sees the universe as the manifestation of human mind and considers the non-deceitfulness of God as guarantee of the objectivity of this perception. For Descartes, mind is the mir- ror of nature. Mind offers itself the images of things existing outside with the real time and space of the universe as well as the objects and events existing Wright, Kathleen, The Work of Art in t he Age of Technology, in Christopher Macann Ahmadi, Babak, , Tehran: Nashr-i markaz, 1381 Sh., reached its zenith. Kants book, , sought to offer an It is therefore on account of mans atti tude that we can talk of space, con- tinuous objects and so forth. If we leave aside the conditions of innateness, con- ditions based on which an external perception takes place Space cannot be represented through anything else. There exists no space in the real world sepa- rated from its representation through a knowing agent. Understanding the exis- tence of space is possible only in the eye of man. Thats why Heidegger de- scribes modern age as an era in which the world and its space dominate as a representation and image. With the Cope rnican revolution of Kant, the domi- know the object , or ; rather, human knowledge should remain within the framework of the phenomena and the empirical world or Hamidreza Ayatollahy assimilated in the entire history and government and is that part of a whole, whose duty is to know the ideas. Hegels philosophy is history-oriented in its Kierkegaard emerged in the Western world as a contrast to all these trends and holistic approaches. It was his personal life, the way he was brought up and his religious considerations which led Kierkegaard to the thought that philoso- phical systems of the past (such as Hegels philosophy), which attempt to offer an abstract and, at the same time, comprehensive and universal explanation of existence and the universe, even at their apogee, have lost sight of the individual mine the meaning of existence, because existence, in Hegelian dialectic and historical movement, transforms itself in to a general abstract issue. Kierkegaard first took issue with Hegelian philosophy because of its universality and ob- jectivity; he repudiated the possibility of mediation, i.e., the possibility of re- synthesis and higher. He emphasized the priority or precedence of being over quiddity and it seems that he was the first to attach an existential meaning to existence. He is radically anti-rationalist: in his view, one can never under- J.G. Hamann (17301788), who infl uenced Kierkegaard, considers existence inconceivable to thought, and with respec t to the subject-oriented trend of the West, asserts: the less I think, the more I am. Kierkegaard distinguishes be- tween innate existence and what is ca lled existing haphazardly, and applies It seems that Kierkegaard has concerned himself with a number of important tasks. First, attaching significance to particularity and individuality of man and his own self; second, overcoming epistemology which is the presupposition of subject-object distinction; and finally, putting forth two key concepts of fear and free will in order to pay attention to mans individuality and to overcome epis- temology. In fear, subject and object are no longer in contrast, because in fear Wahl, Jean, with free will, I frequently materialize myself. Kierkegaard is radically against Kierkegaard made the individual the bas ic subject of his philosophy and that when an individual faces decisions to make, brought to him by existence, he in fact shoulders non-transferable res ponsibilities. Undoubtedly, these philoso- for being existent as a human being. Anyone in his personal situation should Kierkegaard is the enemy of conceptual thinking too, a kind of thinking that endeavors to conceptually and rationally expl ain the problems of the whole uni- According to Kierkegaard, collecting abs tract concepts, based on principles of rationalism in order to develop a system of thinking for justifying the uni- verse and man and origin and source, is a vain attempt deserving ridicule. Man is not and cannot be the one who establishes the truth. It is truth which encom- In Kierkegaards view, a kind of idealism is embedded in every philosophy, as it solely deals with quidditive concepts. He also does not see God as some- thing that is substantiated by the intell ect. Intellectual substantiation of God is a absolute loneliness before God and the grie f of his fate. He finds a coincidence throw the tower built with the coming of the age of illumination, modernity and Macquarie, John, , tr. Mohammad Saeed Hanaei Kashani, Tehran: Bochenski, Innocentius, , tr. Sharaf al-Din Khora- Hamidreza Ayatollahy an end, insisted upon this belief that what is of importance is not the truth or correctness of this decree or that doctri ne or belief, but their influence [here] view considering modern man an instrum ent prevents him from arriving at a the flow. For Bergson, continuation cannot be measured. It is dependent upon our memories and a lot of our emotions, all of which are vague and myste- Heidegger, too, puts the conceptual explanation of the universe aside and forsakes the tools of Kant and Hegel. Instead, he attempts to analyze the relation tents. Thus, his existentialism is no longer a conceptual issue or an acquired knowledge. When man is described by means of and in possession of In the history of philosophy, the only th ing not thought of is existence itself which is nothing but presence and manifestation. According to Heidegger, the history of philosophy has been a history of disregarding existence. He focuses on the works of the Presocratics, because they were free from objectification sight of the presence of existence in mans quiddity and thereby we become unable to recognize this quiddity which, human entities as special existences among plants and animals, and presume a Heidegger, Martin, , tr. John Macquarie and Edward Robinson, New Heidegger, Martin, Hamidreza Ayatollahy tains its totality of existence within the three distinct temporal areas of the past, the present and the future. Thus, we cannot any longer see time as a collection of moments, as Aristotle did, or describe time as a subject attained or lost. the limits of universe. Resting on the far-sighted preparedness man has for being-in-the-world, he also possesses nec essitation or a distinct involvement. Presentiment exploits the accessibility of the sun, which is the emitter of light Existence as it is cannot be substant iated by reasoning; making deductions about existence is inconceivable, because we are trying to extract it from a differ- ent affair. The only possible way is th en to demonstrate it. Existence can merely Heidegger believes that man can perceive absolute existence also through understanding absolute nonexistence (and not relative nonexistence). Absolute and pure nonexistence means mere darkness, that is, where there is nothing, or as Heidegger puts it, where there is the well of nonexistence. When man stands in front of this well, he is seized with awe and fear and finds himself in bewilderment about the existence. He will then be made to taste existence. It is here that the perceptual model disappears and the selfs experience of existence Mulhall, Stephen, , LondonNew York: Routledge, 1 Verneaux, Roger; Wahl, Jean, the towering mystics had perceived via the guidance of their intellectual intui- tion and mystical power, and then established a new foundation and based it on sound and unshakable principles and ru les; regarding reasoning and argumenta- tion, he changed philosophical issues so that they resemble principles of Until Sadras time, all philosophical issues would be probed into based on a conceptual, quidditive model and with an Aristotelian categorical approach. Even if existence were considered, the dominance of quidditive attitude margin- alized it and the issues related to existence were studied with the same attitude. Sadra made existence the pivotal point of his philosophical discussion and, by demonstrating the existential reality of the universe, endeavored to explore other philosophical issues from an existential perspective and in an entirely different context. Due to this fundamental difference and on account of the profound ac- quaintance with mystical doctrines, all philosophical issues assumed a new course and overcame the obstacles experienced by Western epistemology. For, presence or perception of the very ex istence or the very divine act. Fur- thermore, it was through this doctrine th at Mulla Sadra could demonstrate the chain connecting all levels of reality, and finally, he brought to light the doctrine of supreme unity of existence, which Qazi, Nabi Bakhsh, Exist ential Philosophy of Mulla Sadra and Heidegger, in Nasr, Seyyed Hossein, Hamidreza Ayatollahy and at least three proofs in the in order to substantiate the prin- Another central idea in Sadras philo sophy is gradation of existence and, consequently, the theory of the unity in plurality and plurality in unity. Sadra explains the entire chain of beings with these two theories. Unlike univocal con- cepts (e.g., the concept of body), the concept of existence is graded, i.e., the attribution of objects to existence is not similar; rather, there are anteriority, posteriority and priority, as the attribution of existence to God, who possesses no limit, cannot be compared with its attri bution to other beings. Sadra and the followers of the Transcendent philosophy call these gradations generic and be- lieve in another kind of gradation for the objective reality of existence which is described as specific gradation, whose cha racteristic is that no two referents of existence are independent of one anothe r and each is deemed a gradation of the Based on the graded nature of the reality of existence, Mulla Sadra pro- poses unity in plurality and plurality in uni ty as the most evident attributes of exis- tence. According to this theory, existence, which is the only objective and origi- this view, the plural and va rious quiddities appearing to the intellect and sense are not baseless, but are abstracted from the ranks and degrees of existence. Unified existence is not pure, and hence the mystics theory of unity of exis- adr al-Dn al-Shrz; Muammad Ibrhm, p. 7. adr al-Dn al-Shrz; Muammad Ibrhm, , Beirut: Dr Iy al- ranks of a single truth and they share common grounds and causes for unity. However, distinction and unity are not, despite having similarity, to be consid- ered inconsistent with the expanse of existence which is indisputable and defi- nite; rather, in existential truths, the common aspect fits into the same cate- gory as the distinguishing factor and th e differences lie in their degree, their perfection and imperfection. Basically, degrees are possible solely for the ranks Proximity to existence and its rulings in Sadras philosophy is not concep- tual, quidditive and categoricalit needs to be explored with tools other than conceptual and quidditive ones; this proximity should be existential and con- scious; this kind of knowledge draws near to intuitive knowledge. Conceptuali- zation is the stage coming after existential and conscious perception. Anyhow, with Mulla Sadra, as with Heidegger, a kind of fundamental revolution took place in philosophy in order to give it more profundity; because Islamic phi- losophy, till then engaged in discussions of quiddity, shifted into the discussion of existence with Mulla Sadra. However, they both put forth their own novel One of the results of the principality of existence is that the only self- the more their amount increases and their scope narrows; in turn, the more they ascend and approach Godhead, the more their number decreases and their exis- tence extends, to the point that finally they reach the most exalted rank, which contains all existential excellences and is limitless, absolute and infinite. There- fore, all ranks of existence have limits and restrictions, save the supreme rank, into play too, because nonexistence is the reverse of existence and, where exis- tence is not present, nonexistence occurs. Of course, nonexistence is imaginary Regarding nonexistence, Mulla Sadra explains: nonexistence is a general simple concept, whose meaning is not subject abab, Sayyid Muammad ussayn, , Tehran: Tehran Univer- Hamidreza Ayatollahy emerge when nonexistence is attributed to different subjects. Such difference causative it is. In sum, this theory of gradation, according to which existence is Now, after examining the major concerns of existential thought in the two philosophical traditionsthe Transcendent Wisdom of Mulla Sadra and existen- Rahman, Fazlul, . Albany, NY: State University of New tentialism is a reaction to the formal European philosophy, which, from Plato to Hegel, was basically a quidditive principality. Years before the modern existen- tialism, Sadra, through defending the principality of existence, started a revolu- Both philosophers discarded the conceptual, quidditive, categorical and molded attitude towards events and objects. Both dispensed with employing quidditive and conceptual tools such as Ka tential experience rather than through rational investigationhad an experience which revealed to them the reality of existence . The existentialists do not It is true that Mulla Sadra and Heidegger react to intellect, but there are dif- ferences in the stances they adopt. The tool Sadra employs to know existence is intuition, but this intuition does not contradict intellect; rather, it is complemen- tary to it. Hence, Mulla Sadras attitude towards intellect is not hostilehe also believes in the necessity for a deductive intellect in philosophical wayfaring; by contrast, Heideggers ideas in existen tialism demonstrate that he neither advo- Syed, Atiya, Sadra and Existentialism, in Hamidreza Ayatollahy Existentialists employ subjects like stress, fear, decisive choice, death, and futility or alienation to describe the existential states of man and thereby avoid conceptualization, which, in Western philosophy, is engaged in epistemology and the dualism of subject-object. Regarding their attitudes, of his mortality and the instability of hi s place in the world, the place in which In order to investigate the views of the ancients regarding existence, Mulla Sadra exploits issues generally prevalent cussing all the shortcomings in their teachings, he turns to existential attitude Definition Existence, from the point of view of existentialist philosophers, cannot be defined, for definition is possible in the framework of concepts and deals with concepts, whereas existence is not a concept and cannot be known by definition and acquired knowledge. What can be known through the process of definition is the existent, not the existence. Exis tence cannot be defined and thus should be perceived. That is why all philosophers of existentialism begin with a so-called which is evidently of various kinds at perience, for Jaspers, expresses itself in becoming aware of the fragility of exis- tence, in the experience of moving towards death for Heidegger and in the concept of nausea for Sartre. Existentialists never conceal the fact that their phi- losophy is founded upon such an experience and that is why the existential phi- can only try to approach it. Sadra, too, believes existence to be indefinable. Ex- istence is the most axiomatic and basic reality and concept. Existence is the most fundamental concept, with whose aid we perceive other concepts, and the reality of existence is the most immediate and principal experience of existence; an experience which is the basis of our perception of the external world. Mans awareness of existence is immediate and intuitive and unattainable with any sort of mental analysis. Pure existence neither takes the form of an external material object to be perceived, nor changes into a finite mental concept. However, the immediate intuitive understanding of existence may later transform into a con- ceptual understanding. Profound perception of the reality of existence, unlike the subjective concept of existence (in modern existentialist terms, the essence of existence) is extremely difficult, as it requires a special kind of spiritual pre- ll people. However, if someone is given to contem- Both philosophical trends draw a In other words, they both separate the concept of existence from the reality of existence, and contend that the reality of existence cannot be perceived through its concept. However, these trends differ in the following: when Mulla Sadra speaks of the concept of existence and deems it axiomatic, he recourses to ra- existence is superior to all logical categories, such as genus, species and specific difference, because it has no definition, and what cannot be defined, cannot be logically proved. Existence possesses no cause, no matter, no place; it is the cause of all causes, the form of all forms and the truth of all things. Hence, Mulla Sadras analysis of exis- tences indefinable nature and its self-evidence is a logical one. The existential- ist philosophers, however, provide a phenomenolog ical analysis of this issue. Of course, phenomenology, according to Heidegger, is not a scientific philosophy , nor a science among other sciences, or a propedeutical science to offer mabs-i Asfr Hamidreza Ayatollahy has an existence. More precisely, he does not possess exis- tence; rather, he is the existence of himself. If man has a quiddity, this quiddity Hence, Western existentialism is basically man-oriented. The fact that exis- tentialism is defined as the tradition of the special principality of mans exis- tence is a testimony to the claim that inquiry into existence is first put forward by man. For man is the only existent wh ich questions existence in general and his existence is therefore existential, i.e., related to being. This being is specific to man who, among other animals, has the gift of being able to question. The ability to question is in fact an analysis of the conditions of the possibil- In Mulla Sadras point of view, the principality of existence deals merely with the very core of existence, which is its reality, and not its meaning. This entails everything, from the pure divine exi stence to the unstable material exis- tence. The pure existence, via self-revealing process and through the creation of the ranks of existence, expresses itself in various forms. These ranks of exis- tence render certain innate characteristics to the mind. Hence, it is not in the external realities, but in the mind that quiddities appear as the secondary nature negative and unreal. Since quiddities are in themselves nothing, if they exist, their existence will depend upon their being attached to real existences, which Therefore, by existence, the existentialists mean merely the existence of man and the specific nature of mans existence in the world, whereas in Mulla Sa- dras view, the truth of existence entails all ranks of existence; though the low ranks are naturally dependent on the absolute existence, and the pure reality of existence is God. All these ranks, due to their sharing a spiritual cause, have received attention in Mulla Sadras philosophy. The existentialists never apply existence to God and in fact place God outside the domain of existence. They solely endeavour to assess mans situation and there is no word on the absolute reality. That is why Heidegger does not discuss existence with regard to exis- tents other than man; they just are there, while only man exists. However, Mulla Sadra is concerned only with the very core of existence. It is the absolute exis- tence which is principal, meaning that, generally, the reality of existence has precedence over quiddity. (It should be noted that it is in the arch of descent that the precedence is accorded to existence; in the arch of ascent, in Sadras belief, Navali, Mahmood, quiddity receives the priority.) That is to say, in mind, we are dealing with quid- In the external world, there is only existence and quiddities are nothing but limits of existence in the mind. The reality of existence cannot be defined and its essence is totally hidden, though its meaning is quite evident and On the basis of the above discussion, another issue comes to the fore: for both existential philosophers and Mulla S adra, existence has priority over quid- existential philosophers, mans special existence has precedence over his quid- dity but, for Sadra, the reality of existence has priority over quiddity. In Sadras attitude, in the external world, there exi sts nothing but existence, and this exter- nal world is filled with existence, though of various ranks. It is only in the course of mental analysis that we s eparate quiddity from existence. Hence, in Mulla Sadras opinion, quiddity is the limit of existence, whereas for existential- ists, quiddity is created by existence. All these fragile, unstable situations of man originate from the fact that his speci al existence has priority over his quid- on values he opts for, he is drawn towards the materialization of his existence From the above discussions, it follows that both existentialists and Sadra have deeply pondered on the meaning of quiddity. Though, according to both philosophical systems, quiddity is a s econdary reality, they disagree over one basic point: to existentialists, quiddity re fers to the quiddity of particular indi- viduals; they never imagine quiddity to be a holistic issue; as each man has one quiddity, that quiddity is specific to him. However, according to Mulla Sadra, Biemel, Walter, , tr. Bizhan Abd al-Karimi, Te- Hamidreza Ayatollahy quiddity is an abstract concept, generally applied to all men and, possessing no integrated reality, it is a mental, subjective phenomenon. If a reality can be at- tion of the truth of existence is very difficult, because the prevalent interp ing is epistemological and conceptual. Profound perception of the reality of ex- istence, unlike that of the subjecti ve concept of existence (in modern existential- ist terms: the essence of existence), is extremely difficult, for it requires a spe- cial spiritual preparedness not possessed by all people. However, if someone is Heidegger very properly opens the disc ussion of how to face existence and, to that aim, puts forward concepts such as the well of nonexistence, stress, death, faces such cases. In this regard, we can loosely declare that Heidegger too be- lieves in the mystic journey for perceiving the truth of existence, but Sadra does not go far into that discussion. In his opinion, though the concept of exis- tence is the most evident, its essence philosophies, including that of Heidegger s, is basically achieved through nega- a different attitude towards discovering the manifestation of Gods act is pure existence which is his sign and effect, i.e., the manifestation of that mysterious, light-like fact, which causes objects to leave the ocean of nonexistence and enjoy the blessing of existence. But this differing attitude can be seen as more relevant to mysticism; it is the path of been employed. Phenomenology is an epistem ological theory that provides a new understanding of knowledge. Affirmative perception of existence is not provided for by any specific epistemological attitude in Mulla Sadras philoso- phy. Thus, in Islamic tradition, ontology has no trace of epistemology and has Vahid al-Rahman, A. N. M., Comparative St Distinction istent but, on the other hand, he sees them as one. That is to say, in his view, the adjectival form of existence which refers to what exists is different from its ver- bal form, i.e., to exist. To continue this discussion in a traditional Aristotelian framework, we can argue that what had been the focus of Aristotles attention was existent, which, in his philosophica l tradition, refers to a quiddity, actual- ized in the external world. Dismissing t he principality of quiddity and taking the whose major concern is the analysis of existence, for in his opinion, quiddity is nothing but a limit of existence; in fact, quiddity gains validity from existence. That is why the principality of exist ence, which is founded upon a new discov- ery and perception of reality, has turned in ics; a pillar he seeks to logically substantiate so as to make it the basis of sub- stantiation for his other doctrines. This lian framework of early Islamic philoso phy and offered a new perception of the most profound order of reality in whi ch everything is seen as the presence or In the , Mulla Sadra argues that the truth of all things refers to their ex- istential attributes, which is the same as their existential rank. Now, as the actu- he considers the perception of the trut h of existence to be the main concern of the West, which started after Plato and Aristotle, we come to understand that in this tradition of thinking, existent has always been under discussion, but the existence itself has never received attention, so that, as regards existence, West- thousand years ago. Existence expects man to remember it as an appropriate Heidegger describes the existential atti ing a forgotten meaning. In such an attitude, philosophers, rather than contem- plating existence and being, concentrate on existent(s). The ontic attitude, with its scientific look, absorbed in the char acteristics of objects and existents, per- Hamidreza Ayatollahy ceives existence and being merely in the light of such characteristics. Heidegger asserts that, in such an attitude, exist ence is regarded as a pre-experiential con- aid scientific investigation is to start; then, we can be sure that, finally, the pri- mary meaning hypothesized for existence is confirmed. They declare that our perception of existence is dependent upon our understanding of the existential mines an existent as an entity. It is true that existence is always the existence of an existent, but this cannot be expressed in terms of the existent and its attrib- According to existential philosophers, man is always surrounded by possi- bilities. The world, prior to receiving mans attention, had a particular possibil- ity. That particular possibility refers to the attributes of objects and events in the world. Man, with his free will, and with his choices and decisions, constantly which makes man aware of the instability of his state. But, in Mulla Sadras In Heidegger and generally in existentiali st philosophies, proximity to exis- tence takes place through understanding mans free will; but in Mulla Sadras philosophy, this is achieved via secondary philosophical intelligibles. Free will This can be conspicuously seen in Ki to exist and to have free will are expressions more or less synonymous. Like and existence. This is not the case w hen man first comes into existence and then possesses free will and freedom; rather, to be man means to have free will in For Heidegger, too, things are more or less the same. Man, with his free will, can select from among his choices, and can con stantly actualize himself with these choices. Thus, man, without free will, does not exist at all, and then, like other non-human existents, is merely there. Therefore, human existence can mainly be perceived through the experience of free will. We can then draw the existence and freedom (free will), and for him, without taking into account the latter, the investigation of the former is deemed impossible. when talking about human freedom, he meant the exist ential aspect of freedom: freedom as On the other hand, Mulla Sadra attempts to understand existence through the secondary philosophical inte lligibles. He argues that man, consciously and exis- tentially, perceives existence , as it flows in the mind and reality. Issues enjoy absolute reality and thus we can establish relationship For instance, Heidegger, in the , puts forward the issue of com- tence, our attitude towards existents ought to change and to transcend the mere focus on existent, and should aim at t he perception of the reality of existence. Transcendence comes about based on awe and bewilderment. The first feeling say, nonexistence is awe-inspiring and existence is bewildering. Awe is a dis- covering experience, in which man sees the experience of existence as founded upon nonexistence. Therefore, it is with th e help of awe that one can go beyond existential entities. It is merely du e to the manifestation of nonexistence in mans foundation of existence that the compl not exist in that it is nonexistent. He goes on to analyze how human intellect can Perotti, James L., , tr. Mohammad Reza Jowzi, Tehran: Saqi, Hamidreza Ayatollahy conceptualize what does not exist and then employs that concept as a subject. He believes that intellect is able to imagine and create all kinds of concepts; for example, intellect can create the concept of nonexistence and it can even create the concept of absolute nonexistence. In other words, in Sadras view, nonexis- tence is merely a mental form, not a reality. The discovery of existence takes There seem to be three solutions for the issue of nonexistence: nonexistence does not exist at all; nonexistence exists lute nonexistence; nonexistence exists. Parmenides accepts the first choice. De- mocritus believes in the second one and considers a void nonexistence, a non- existence which exists. Plato agrees with a kind of nonexistence that he inter- example. In contrast to Parmenides idea, non-being exists. Relative non-being is one of the principal categories of thought and, for the stream of thought, for the activity of the mind, as well as for the factual reality, non-being is as neces- sary as existence. Aristotle accepted t he relative non-being which is the poten- tial existence, and this is the third conception of nonexistence. Hegel observes that the conception of existence results in the conception of nonexistence. The conception of existence and the concepti on of nonexistence are the conditions Heidegger has attempted to find a reality for nonexistence. He asserts that when he talks about nonexistence, he in fa ct talks about existence, because exis- tence avoids being defined and conceptualized. Therefore, what we find in non- existence is existence itself. Heidegger, more than others, has focused on the positive characteristics of nonexistence. But, as soon as we decide to define it, oldest philosophical discussions. To Pa rmenides, man cannot know what is and what is not. Gorgias, however, contends that if nonexistence does not exist, ex- istence cannot exist either. Plato, too, different attributes, nonexistence should be noticed too. According to Heidegger, when man raises the fundamental question (why existents exist rather than not tence exists, then how is it possible for a th ing that exists not to exist? And if we say nonexistence does not exist, then how can we talk about nonexistence? Therefore, Heidegger states that what nothingness does is to play nothingness. This is the only way we can talk of nothingness. if non-being is not at issue, so is being. Non-being puts being in the position of being. Human existence is To Heidegger, nonexistence is the oldest issue in philosophy and in his tence is not a matter of concern, then nei ther is existence. Hence, it is nonexis- tence that places existence in its right position. Human existence is related to existence in that it places itself outsi de nonexistence, and we inevitably ought to nonexistence is unknown. In turn, nonexis tence for Heidegger is absolute and b) For Mulla Sadra, nonexistence is of a secondary status compared to exis- tence, while to Heidegger, nonexistence is as fundamental as existence. Loosely we can say that, in existentialist ph ilosophies, existence and nonexistence are c) In Mulla Sadras view, nonexistence is only the logical act of negation. In Heideggers philosophy, however, it refers to the non-beings reality. The dis- agreements among people, the intensity of hatred, the pain of failure and the Heidegger, Martin, , ed. W. McNeill. Cambridge: Cambridge University Hamidreza Ayatollahy ing the gradation of existence. Such an idea is not a matter of concern in modern existentialism. Other significant elements are substantial movement and the classification of reality. According to Mulla Sadra, in all ranks of possible exis- tence has a hierarchy of ranks, and every existent in the universe, based on its But, for Heidegger, existence is neither God nor the foundation of the world. However, by possibility, which is mostly described as the possibility of need, Sadra means the innate poverty and need of existents, hinting that the whole Principality in Heideggers philosophy is entirely different from what it is in Mulla Sadras philosophy. In Heidegger, principality refers to and its can remember its past and historical roots and per- ceives what tradition offers to it. As it knows its past, its perception is a truly and the truth of existence in Mulla Sadras thought is primarily and essentially God. Existence, as a reality, not as a concept, is the essence of reality and the ulti- mate truth or reality. This ultimate trut h is Allah. His essence is only known to Him, for He is, absolutely and without qualification, exalted in His essence. Heideggers contention is that theology, through relating everything to God, prevents questioning and thereby avoids answering undesired questions. In di- vine thought, existence does not appear mysterious and puzzling. Mulla Sadra, however, regards God as the source and the destination of the world and sees everything on the move towards him. This movement is uni-directional, leading Time is another issue discussed in both philosophies, though in an entirely different way in each case. As discussed above, in Heideggers philosophy, time is identical with existence and existence is the same as time, and a considerable In various works of Mulla Sadra too, time has come under discussion and 1. Time is the measure of positional movement of the greatest sphere regard- ing anteriority and posteriority. This view has been proposed in the and the , and is in fact identical with 2. Time is the measure of the substantial movement of sphere in terms of priority and posteriority. This view has been expressed in such works as al 3. Time is the measure of the self-generative natural existence. This is the principal theory of Mulla Sadra, whose various aspects are explored and which is especially elaborated in the According to this theory, time is a rela- the weakest of the possible beings holding the most inferior rank among the Furthermore, material existents have a co mmon root with time and, as it is im- the bodies, so it is also impossible to Al-Attas, Seyyed Mohammad Naqib, Mosleh, Ali Asghar, Time according to Mulla Sadra and Qaysari, in Hamidreza Ayatollahy Therefore, in the discussion of time, these philosophies resemble each other in that in Heidegger, time and are interrelated, and in Mulla Sadra, time and existence in material objects are interrelated. However, in Heidegger, this relation is proposed merely with respect to Heidegger sees man as surrounded by a series of possibilities; it is according to these conditions that he explains pr incipality. 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C        $ , ?& =& +=& -7    /, , &      ,  *     , 2, $  , $    $         *   ,    & & &  $ &, - %     =&    $     ' &  &.       $  2     ,  " $ ,  4  7 + %  2 '$       -    *    /. 4  9        $ -     ,  4  7    ,  $ "    $  %  " '. )   &    &   -    & $ , $  B    & " - 9    2      $       $  4  7,  , ' ,    '    $   &  $ . 8    4  7    2 "  &  - &  & $ . 2        , 4  7 $  2         '       * 2. ) ' 2           $         , , $                 $- 2  & $  4  7, $ " &      2- �,      4 ?  :  +. DEFDDGHE/. C    $       & ' &    2. 1       ,    $   * '  $  & $      ,   * '. 1       � +. DDEJDGKL/     ! "!#       � +. DEKDDGHK/    +      % - /,   " & &    &    -   -     � +. DEHMDGGD/ '  2A - - +    5  -7  8 /,   "   � +. DDLMDHME/   � +. DDHLDHGE/    - -    � +. DMNGDFLD/     -   4 2,         -  2. 1      $ , $"  '  &    '   - � +.  DMJHDFND/          � +. DMHEDFJL/    $  � +. DMFDDFGN/          '  � +. DMFFDFHD/   +   '       &&/,   -        � +. DLEGDFFF/       -   '       &     + !  !    /      ;              �� +DLEDDFFLDLJL .&.DKHN/ -   ) ��+DMFDDKELDLGEDKFD/ !  8 ' , $ 4  9   ,  &   2    &           &  ,  &       ,      ,   *      . '          .   *    � +. DEFFDGHH/               � +. DDELDGKM/   � +. DEKF  DEKKDGFG  DGFH/      -  " ' � +. DLDNDFKG/   4        & "$  &     The major theme of Sadras ontology is an inquiry into the meaning of Ex- istence. Here, with an emphasis on such inquiry, not only does Sadra abandon his previous position of the principality of essence but also the notion of es- sence-existence duality disappears from his thinking as well. This abandonment of essentialism is a direct consequence of a philosophical turn described in his addresses and encompasses all other questi ons, including the question concern- ing change, becomes primordial. What we can see here, is the way in which the focus on change can be construed through the way in which we comprehend the meaning of Existence because change is an existential phenomenon and hap- pens when Existence becomes manifest in different modes. The relation be- tween Existence and its resultant modes is like that of the ground with the grounded, From this it follows that the existence of the creator must be the ground for the existence of the created entity and not external to it, just as is necessitated from the creation of its ess ence and its being created. I would say: yes, nothing is wrong with that. The existence of the effect is strengthened by its cause, as imperfection is strengthened by perfection, weakness, by strength, and contingency by necessity. This point is crucial for under- Mulla Sadra, Muhammad Kamal change is not simple and appears in a twofold way, corresponding to the trans- formation of all modes of Existence as well as There can be no doubt that not only is Sadra concerned with change, but his thought employs a different sense of it, in particular when it is seen as a process of unceasing renewal in the form of dressing after dressing ( labs bada labs ). In this respect, it is not only the accidents, but also the substance from which this constant transformation proceeds and continues until it reaches its own perfec- tion. In this process, change involves both the accidental and the substantial. Substance, like its own accidents, could not escape transformation and progress. The fundamental continuity and the identity of the changing entity are also de- pendent on Existence, which becomes the principle of unity in multiplicity. It is clear that Sadra does not deny change in accidents, but he insists that no acci- dental change could take place without change in substance. Everything in the world, including the world as a whole, is subject to substantial as well as acci- Muhammad Kamal contraries. In no other case could one brin g forward anything, numerically one, which is able to receive contraries. For example, a colour, which is numerically one and the same, will not be black and white, nor will numerically one and the same action be bad and good; and similarly with everything else that is not sub- stance. A substance, however, numerically one and the same, is able to receive contraries. For example, an individual manone and the samecan become pale at one time and dark at another, and hot and cold, and bad and good. An individual human being is a primary su bstance and has no contraries, but re- ceives them. There is nothing contrary to Socrates, for example, and this indi- vidual does not admit of a more or a less. There is no moment, in which Socra- tes is more or less a human being than what he is. Change continues in the acci- dents, but as long as a substance exists it will remain the same and numerically Aristotle, Categories, 4a 1020, in arguments, Mahdi Dehbashi cites five secondary arguments, which are derived In the first argument, Sadra demonstrat es that there will be no accidental change without substantial change, as the former is dependent on the latter, stat- ing that, Accidents, however, are existentially dependent on the existence of formal substances. But, as you know, motion itself has no reality except a con- tinuous renewal and transformation ( ) of some entity; it is not itself an entity, because motion is precisely the re lation of renewal, not an entity on which renewal depends. What is accidental is necessarily substantial, and ac- cidental changes should be subordinated to substance simply because accidents have no reality of their own and are totally dependent on their substances. It is the continuous renewability of substance that brings about change in accidents. There are, however, two possible ways of understanding this argument. On the one hand, accidental change cannot be generated by accidents, as accidents are not able to exist by themselves. Their existence is part and parcel of substance. Mulla Sadra, , 3, Stage 7, chapter 28, translated by Mahdi Dehbashi, London: Muhammad Kamal substances have inextricable accidents. destruction and without any stability at all. The second is perduring in Gods presence, incorruptible and incapable of destruction, because whatever is known to God, the Exalted, [in His exemplary idea], cannot be eliminated; that is to say, the knowledge of God, the Exalted, cannot be changed. Based on this distinc- Mulla Sadra, , 8, chapter 3, in Spiritual Psychology , the Fourth Intellectual Journey in Transcendent Philosophy, vols. 8 and 9, translated, annotated, and introduced by Latimah-Parvin Peerwani, with foreword by Sayyed Khalil Toussi, London: ICAS Press, 2008, Muhammad Kamal of it due to the thick veils [of ignorance over their souls], and darkness, piling up over them. But this essential movement and this journey towards God the Exalted is more evident and manifest in man, especially in a Perfect Man, who traverses all [levels] of the ascending arc. The evolutionary character of sub- stantial change is not unpredictable, but Mulla Sadra, , 8, chapter 3, in Spiritual Psychology , the Fourth Intellectual ephemeral substance. In this case, Sadra counts on the principle of Existence: since all corporeal substances are different modes of Existence and Exis- tence is the sole reality, the identity of a corporeal substance could be estab- lished through Existence. A corporeal subs tance changes itself constantly, but, whatever happens, even when the physical body is destroyed, it remains the If existence of the corporeal substance is destroyed and a new existence (not a new substance) is created, then nothing remains as the unifying principle Mulla Hadi Sabzawari, Muhammad Kamal Mulla Hadi Sabzawari,           ,      -         ,        -      .    ,                      .    ,               - .   !      "   -         #    . $  " ,     #     "   ! % & , '%  . (  %   )    "  #    ,  ,    ,      * ! -+,   " -+ . #      - / #                -   2         ,       -      ,       !  - 3.   %  ,  " -+            . 4 #  "     -      "    "      ,   %-       !       ,   %%       + #    +,       ,    -  -  . , 1425/2004,           "        . &   "           %  ,           +   "   . 4 #       %      "          "        .   " ,  "             #       6.    ,     "    ,             ,              .            ,           "  "  .   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Aubrey de Selincourt, rev. A. R. Burn, Harmondsworth: Sayyd Khalil Toussi The advocates of such views assume that there are no extra-mental moral facts relating to the nature of things that make one sort of action right and an- other wrong. Pyrrho makes this assertion explicit by saying that nothing is honourable or dishonourable, just or unjust he held that there is nothing really existent, but custom and convention govern human actions; for no single Modern sceptics, while agreeing that there are no moral facts, have been at- tracted to the idea that morality originates in the desire and emotions of the in- Whatever are the objects of any mans ap Diogenes Laertius, Lives of Eminent Philosophers , vol. 2, tr. R. D. Hicks (Loeb Classical Thomas Hobbes, tence of moral facts is to be defended, we need to be able to say how they are These and other objections which have been raised against objectivism mean that moral objectivism cannot be supporte d easily. They probably cannot frame L. Mackie, The Subjectivity of Values, in: James Rachels (ed.), Sayyd Khalil Toussi Subjectivists may also assert that, when somebody sees a murderer in action and observes what he does, he concludes that this action is wicked. We can ex- plain this observation without referring to the extra-mental fact of wickedness at all. There is a killer, a victim, and an act that causes death; the observer sees all this in the usual way and then reacts negatively to what he sees. To explain his observation we only need to refer to the observers psychology and perhaps to There are other ways of understanding objectivity of moral facts. One such way can be sought in Aristotles view. According to Aristotelian worldview, the world is created within a rational orderly system with values and purposes in- herited into its very nature. Everything has a purposefor example, the purpose of a tree is to grow to give wood and fruit, and the purpose of the heart is to pump blood, and the purpose of rain is to provide water for the tree. In this sys- tem, everything has its own place and purpose, and the arrangement in the whole world is quite favourable to human being. This combination of ideas forms the core of our opinion of what the world is like. It would be then natural 2. The second explanation is that mora l properties are not peculiar, but are identical with ordinary properties. For example, the property of being morally good might be identical with the property of being pleasurable. There is nothing mysterious about being pleasurable. Everybody can understand what it is and This explanation significantly depends on wh different picture of the universe (see David Hume, Essays: Moral, Political and Literary See John Locke, An Essay concerning Human Understanding of observers. The boxs shape and mass would be the same even if there were no conscious beings in the universe. But what about its colour? Colour is not a thing spread upon the box like a coat of paint. The boxs surface reflects light waves in a certain way. Then, this light strikes the eyes of observers, and as a result, the observers have visual experiences of a certain character. If the light waves falling on the box were different, or if the visual apparatus of the ob- server were different, then the box would appear to have a different colour. The redness of box, then, consists in its power, under certain conditions, to cause observers to have a certain kind of visual experience. Another example is the sourness of the lemon. The lemon is sour because, when we put it to our tongue, we experience a certain kind of taste. What is sour for humans might not be sour for animals with different kinds of sense organs; and if we were made differ- ently, lemons might not be sour for us. We do have a notion of what is normal for our species in this regard, but despite all this, to say that lemons are sour is not a subjective remark. It is absolutely objective fact that lemons have the Moral properties could be properties of this kindthey could be powers to cause us to have certain sorts of attitude or emotion. Being evil might consist in having whatever it takes to provoke a thoughtful person to hatred, opposition, and contempt. When we think of the murderer and his victim, the (ordinary) facts of the matter are such that they evoke feelings of horror in us; evil is simply the power to call forth this reactio n. Similarly, being good would consist In Islamic theological texts, under the heading of the problem of reason and revelation and the criterion of good and evil, Muslim theologians explain respectively. When we say that a certain thing or action is good or bad (for in- stance, knowledge is good and ignorance is bad), we mean that it is a quality b) These terms are also used in a utilitarian sense, meaning gain and loss in worldly affairs. Whatever is useful or has utility in our experience, is good, and See Kh jah Nar al-Dn s, Tajrd al-itiqd , al-maqad al-thlith (n.p., n.d.); Jafar Doctrines of Shii Islam , London: I. B. Tauris, 2001; Muhammad al-Husayn, Muz- Imam al-Sadiq , Qum: Sadr Press, 2000; Martin Woodward, Defenders of Reason in Sayyd Khalil Toussi the opposite of it is bad. So, whatever is neither useful nor harmful, is neither The Asharites and their opponents, Mutazilites and Imamites, agree that, in the two senses mentioned above, good and evil are extra-mental and human rea- In the above two senses, there is no difference of opinion in terms of objec- tivity, but good and evil in the second sense may vary from time to time, from individual to individual, and from place to place. In the second sense, there will be nothing permanently or universally good or evil; what is good to one may be evil to others and vice versa Nevertheless, according to all Muslim theologians, ) in this world, and punishment and reward in the next world. Human would make it praiseworthy or blameable and rewardable or punishable. The revelation, not by reason as the Mutazilites and Imamites held. According to the Asharites, revelation alone decides is morally bad. can convert previously declared good into bad, and vice versa. As actions by themselves are neither good nor bad, there is nothing in them that would make them rewardable (good) or punishable (bad). They are made rewardable or punishable by revelation or God. As there is no quality of good or evil residing in the very essence of an act, there can be no question of The main supporting argument for this claim is praising good acts and blaming bad acts by rational people ( al-mad wa al-dhamm al- ). There is a kind of social contract that the people condemn, for example, murder and breaking promises. This is based on the logic that each of us will be Therefore, each of us has a good reason to accept such rules, provided that ra- uqal al-qawm ) accept them as well. In brief, objectivism means that good and bad are rationally defensible; by such reasoning, it may be shown that the prohibitions on murder and promise-breaking and any other moral evils are endorsed by all rational people, of any religion and culture, at any time and place. This version of objectivism is compatible with the objectivism of Social sence of good or bad acts. Using the term (essence), Muslim theologians example, justice is intrinsically good and oppression is inherently evil. The wise man opts for good works and abstains from bad deeds. Since God is Wise ), Benevolent ( mannn ) and Omnipotent ( ), He cer- tainly do moral good and avoid any moral evil. The advocators of this view are See David Gauthier, Why Contractarianism, in: Rachels, James Rachels (ed.), Sayyd Khalil Toussi al-Shrz, adr al-Dn, al-ikma al-Mutaliyya f l-asfr al-aqliyya al-arbaa ) eds. R. Luf, I. Amn, and F. Ummd, 3 edition, Beirt: Dr i y al-turth A peculiar aspect of Sadras ontology is the axiological dimension of exis- tence, which is saturated with qualitative and valuational terms. An ontologi- cally higher substance is not only higher in terms of its existential properties, but is also more perfect, real, reliable, and worthier of consideration, and has more light and luminosity. We can also say that ontologically higher existents are closer to being true, good and beautif ulterms that are to be understood in Influenced by Suhrawardi, Sadra maintains that being signifies pure light ), which is goodness, as opposed to darkness that represents evil. At this point, Sadra, following Ibn al-Arabi, defines being as pure goodness ( summum bonum ), because being is not only the ontic or physical ground of things, but also the source of such axiological qualities as reality, Sayyd Khalil Toussi level of goodness, i.e., a higher level of existence. In fact, all entities are by na- ture inclined to achieve higher levels as their existential goal. Since there are For instance, the faculty of animal and sexual desires ( al-quwwa al-shaha- wn wa al-ayawn ) compensates for the faculty of growing ( al-quwwa al- ). On the other hand, the higher faculties employ the lower faculties in order to achieve their goals. This, in turn, leads to the purification and further perfection of these lower faculties. That al-Shrz, adr al-Dn, , ed. S J. shtiyn, Mashhad: Mashhad University Press, 1385 S. H., p. 7; Javd, mul, Ibn Sn, , Qum: Bdr Press, n.d., pp. 383-389; cf. adr, Asfr Asfr , vol. 8, p. 140; idem, Tafsr al-Qurn , ed. M. Khjav, 9 volumes, Qum: the way of the intellect and prevents the soul from achieving perfections of a Having listed the physical faculties and other material potentialities of this All these are Divine blessings, and there are innumerable instruments and causes for these blessings. Rather, it is to be said that whatever is created by God in this world, in some respect can be called Asfr Asfr Sayyd Khalil Toussi From Mulla Sadras point of view, the purposefulness of the hierarchy of be- al-Shrz, adr al-Dn, , annot. Mull Al Nr, ed. Mu ammad Kh- of the faculty of touch is in perceiving touching consistencies of fine oil and so on; the pleasure of the faculty of imagin ation is in perceiving images; and the pleasure of the faculty of estimation ( ing hope. In turn, the pain of any of the above faculties consists in perceiving their opposites. However, the pleasure of the human rational soul and its perfec- Sayyd Khalil Toussi It is known that man, in terms of his original disposition, transcends will and nature, but in this world human beings ar e imprisoned by nature and even by the intellects that are restricted by social and political ties (i.e., related to the lower See Hjj Mull Hd Sabzavr, , Nb Press, n.p., vol. 2, pp. 163 Sayyd Khalil Toussi of conceptual elaboration and analysis. It is, however, a concept extracted from The reality of these different modes of existence is justified by Sadras prin- ciple of existential gradation. Some corporeal qualities can be discerned by bod- ily senses (e.g., the redness of a box and the sourness of a lemon). The existents of this group are either essences or accidents. But there is still another level of qualities in things that are neither es sences nor accidents. They are moral prop- In epistemological sense, we may say that, in empirical sciences, we discern the existence of things by observation a nd experiments. In mathematics, there edly, moral and immoral acts have extra-mental effects on our life and emo- tions. Our reason can distinguish a particul I wish to express my gratitude to Professor Sajjad Rizvi as many insights in this research originate from our discussions on Mull adrs notion of intentionality and these developed adr al-Dn Shirz (Mull adr), , eds. G. Aavn, N. abb, M. Muammad, R. Akbariyn, A. Rashshd, A. Amad I must mention some important s cholarly work on adrs notion of such as mul, Rizvi, Marcotte, and Bonmariages writings. For a general evaluation of the traditional discussions of mental existence, see mul, Hasanzda, , Qum: Maktab al-ilm al-islm, 1417/1996; for the theory in relation to adrs ontology and semantics, see mainly seco nd part of Rizvis book (Rizvi, Sajjad H., I will start with adrs account of sensation, because it exemplifies the con- frontation with the extra-mental world and is the first level of human production of mental existents. Moreover, sense perception is one of the exemplary cases that enables us to understand the philosophers position in terms of the relation of the self and the extra-mental world. The sensation is the case in which one cannot ignore the extra-mental ( ) reality. So, for example, if a philoso- pher describes sensation wholly in a subjective frame, this is a strong indicator that s/he is an idealist or an anti-realist. I will discuss the object of sense percep- tion in a similar fashion. Yet, the strong internalist tendency in Sadrian account, as we shall see, is balanced by his accepta nce of the reality of the extra-mental Mull adrs proofs for mental existence, , 22/2 (2011), pp. 153182) and Bonmariage, C., How is it possible to see ghouls in the de sert?, in S. Gh. Safavi (ed.), I use in order to refer to the mental/extra-mental ( Monism is one of the central notions in this article. I use it to refer to the idea that exis- tence is a single reality. Different versions of monism have been develope d that go back to Burnyeat, M. F., Aquinas on spiritual change in percepti on, in Dominik Perler (ed.), , LeidenBostonKln: Br ill, 2001, pp. 129ff.; Sorabji, Richard, From Aristotle to Brentano: the development of the concept of intentionality, in H. J. Blumenthal an d H. Robinson (eds.), (Oxford Studies in Sumeyye Parildar vided more explanation on the object of sense. I take their attitude as follows: the object of sense is extra-mental, due to the fact that an extra-mental object is the trigger of sensation and that the self is more passively described. Mull perception is not extra-mental. Although t he conditions of sensation are listed similarly, the Sadrian account is more internalist and radically immaterialist. hout matter, I mean the essence. Although given the emphasis here, one should not think that matter was less important: and Callias are different because of th eir matter but they are the same in This was the way Aristotle built hi s. When it comes to epistemology, knowledge is gained throug h form too. Particular forms are ab- stracted from extra-mental sense objects. Human being (via the intellect) can ap- prehend the common nature (universal) in extra-mental things. Once the common nature of a certain species is established through experience, the intellect main- tains generalizations by judging and univ ersal forms are gained. As for the nature of the relation to the extra-mental world, th e materialistic tenden cy of the Peripa- the aforementioned context: by form I mean the essence of each thing, and its primary sub- (Summer 2012 Edition), Edwa rd N. Zalta (ed.), URL = h ttp:// http://plato.stanford. Another definition (as mentioned above) is sensation as a form of . The thing that has the power of sensation is poten tially what the perceived object is actually. During the proc ess of sensation, the organ which is tical to the object in quality. The identity principle is related to this second definition in the adr keeps a notion of identity in his theory, whilst Avicenna does not follow Aristotle on the idea. Avicenna refines the Aristotelian theory in some other re- spects as well. Moreover, he combines Aris totelian theory with the Neoplatonic Thus, in Avicennas account, two important notions for understanding sensation are and In the first, a universal form is gained through mental abstractio n from the particular characteristics of a , 418a36; cf. , ed. A. F. Al-Ahwn Kindi follows the idea whilst Avicenna strong ly rejects it (On the in tellect, in: Adamson, Sumeyye Parildar Different kinds of knowledge are in most cases due to different levels of ab- straction. In the case of sense perception, the abstraction from material attributes is at its lowest. The notion of knowledge manifested through such an idea of abstraction is quite linear. In the case of sensation, the extra-mental object trig- gers the process and a least abstrac ted sensible form is acquired. With internal senses, material attributes of the form are further extracted and, at the level of intellection, we have purely immaterial forms. adrs description of sense What is meant by can be explained by two points: first, the notions and the , II.2, 59.1114. Caston, Victor, Aristotle and the problem of intentionality, come of the process as a level of existence. adr not only changes the dynam- ics of defining the active agent (as the soul, as mentioned above), but also rede- In contrast to Aristotles causal account mental sense object for adr. The sensatio n is an internal and immaterial process. The soul becomes attentive to an organ, an d only after that, begins. Thus, in contrast to the causal the sensible in essence is the form The intelligent ones by the self-evident [knowle dge] of their intellects perceive that the tion of the sounds is obtained in the ear and no t in other than it. Also, the self-evident [know- ledge] judges that the tongue is not the organ of sight, and the eye is not the organ of taste. It also judges that the tongue is [the organ of] taste and the eye is [the organ of] sight ( , vol. 8, p. 188; adr al-Dn Shirz (Mull adr), As- Sumeyye Parildar presentation, he keeps the notion of medium. The essential move is observable illuminative relation is appropriate [to be ca It has been discussed earlier that the cont Aquinas, Thomas, , London: Blackfriars in Conjunction with Eyre If perception is thought to be a passive process, then the mind can be considered as some form of a container. In line with his denial of a passive process, adr rede- fines the mind: the mind is the souls ability to acquir Chittick, William C., On the teleology of perception, in: S. Gh. Safavi (ed.), adr al-Dn Shirz (Mull adr), al-Masil al-qudsiyya, in: idem, The idea of godlikeness of human being a ppeared long before adr. The similarity manifests itself as human beings ab ility to gradual perf to create mental Sumeyye Parildar human beings have a world of their own. Imagination is the faculty where hu- In terms of explaining the nature of the created forms, adr takes a further step (from relating them to merely imagination) and links the process to the in- tellect as well. According to him, imagi nation is dependent on the activity of the intellect.If so, sensation is then dependent on the intellect. What is more, adr claims that the sensibles are intelligibles: Now every sensible is an intelligible, in the sense the intellect perceives it in reality. The correspondence is trans- formed into a . The forms are created by imagination and, for Steel, Carlos G., Study , Brussel: Koninklijke Academie voor Wetenschappen, abstracted form which the soul created during sensation causes the soul to un- Simply by virtue of the fact that a human being can be unified with its ob- jects of perception, the knowledge process changes it and knowledge occurs as a substantial movement. The lowest level s of perception are not excluded from such change in the human and in their identity. The essential change that the soul undergoes even at the lowest levels of knowledge engenders a different approach to knowledge itself. Knowledge is the process in which the soul trav- els from a material being into an immaterial one. A further claim is also made namely, that knowledge is indeed a mode of existence. Knowledge is a level of existence and with the increase of know ledge the soul changes and travels to a different level of existence. Thus, through knowledge, the soul changes in its essence. According to the identity principle, the soul is nothing but the things All of mans real perce ptions and all of his know ledge, intelligible or sensi- ble are not separable from its existen ce and distinct from its existence. But its The idea that can be combined with another principle of Sadrian psychology, namely that This results in the conclusion that each experience is The investigation is, the soul has three modalities of beingintellective, imaginative and sensory. It has the uni fication with intellect, imagination and senses. So the soul at its perception of This presentation is interesting for a number of reasons. One of the striking issues is adrs immaterialization of the process. This is related to my claim that adr is a hard-core internalist and monist. Moreover, this approach has Mull adr on intensification in being, in: David Reisman (ed.), adr al-Dn Shirz (Mull adr), , ed. S. J. shtiyn, with glosses of . M. H. Sabzawr, Tehran: Imperial Iranian Academy of Philosophy, 1967, p. 203; tr. by S. Darebidy in: Darebidy, Sanei M., Certainty and innate knowledge: a com- parative comparison of the theory of knowledge of Mulla Sadra and Descartes, in: S. Gh. Safavi (ed.), , London: Salman-Azadeh Publications, Sumeyye Parildar mals soul is questioned. Either the animal faculties in human and animal are going to be regarded as being different, and as a result, it will be material in one and immaterial in the other case; or the animal soul will be considered immate- rial too. adr choses the second stance and, in a separate section, attempts to show that the animal soul is immaterial. This gives us a strong case for claim- Earlier, I mentioned that Mull adr manages to produce a balanced ap- discussed so far explains only a radically internalist sensation theory, in which the notion of mental existence is built upon a creative and active notion of the soul. How does he achieve the balanced approach, if even the sensible forms are internal and the relation to the extra-mental world is only preparatory? What is more, how can he escape being a solipsist if the forms created in the soul are claimed not to be the same as the forms in the extra-mental beings? In order to explain this, the second part of this article needs to focus on his monist ontology. What relates the forms in the mind and the forms in the objects of the extra- The idea that animal soul is material can be challenged through differentiating be- tween the notions of being material and being re lated to matter. In this case, although the animal soul is related to the material body, it is still considered not to be material. What might weaken this challenge is that Avicenna uses the flying man argument in relation to only ra- tional soul. If one claims that th e flying man argument is construct ed to prove immateriality of the soul, then the application of the argument mere ly to the rational soul proves that only the rational soul is to be considered immaterial. I am grateful to Andreas Lammer for his insight , vol. 8, p. 45ff.; Peerwani, p. 33ff. The passage in the where adr argument with application to animal s, instead of the human soul, is intriguing. For him, all levels of existenc e have consciousness, manifest consciousness accord- ing to the degree of their perfection. The same is valid for immateriality and immateriality of The notion of ontological priority can be f ound in Aristotles priority by nature and sub- stance ( Sumeyye Parildar lar to substantiality and independence: primacy means that existence exists In short, primacy refers to the source reality and rely . Thus, primacy of existence means that exis- tence is the main principle. If existence is taken as the primary reality, then the language of quiddity-based philosophy must change. For example, there is no ontological proof of God (proof of the veracious: ). Mull adr does not criticise Avicennan terminolog y, nor does he try to revise or change , I.5, p. 31, tr. Marmura, p. 24. adr al-Dn Shirz (Mull adr), , ed. S. J. shtiyn, with , p. 6; adr al-Dn Shirz (Mull adr), its language. Moreover, he places Avicennan language of at the heart of his ontology. Yet he changes the context in which this language is used, and intro- duces a loose usage by interc hangeably using the word w with third degree is (extended) With this third level, adr makes a similar shift in Avicennan language. This level of existence is extension and com- A further explanation of how is the same as is given in the is positive and real, which is the result of our previous demonstrations showing that is real and is that which is the principle Shirz (Mull adr), Asfr Sumeyye Parildar there are existents which manifest the differ ent levels of the reality of existence. The whole universe is built on a relation of this kind. It is thus made clear that is not an empty concept, it is also not an ontological content-less situation that happens to things as if is added on or attached to quiddity. Not only the most comprehensive reality, it is also a reality . This is the reason why it cannot be constrained by the static frames of quiddity. implies a number of inherent in it. This is the reality all realities in the world depend on. Firstly, there is nothing All that can be talked about, or referred to, including a negation of its existence, is listed under in Mull adrs philosophy. Wujd is not only the most comprehensive concept, beyond which there is nothing in reality. As the ultimate reality, it is God that really exists. Everything other than God has a dependent and accidental existence wh ich can also be expressed as rela- tional-copulative and shadowy. In agreement Bahmanyr ibn al-Marzubn, Ab al-asan, , Tehran: Dnishgh-i Tihrn, The reality ( is the most manifest of things presentially and through , p. 6, Nasr, pp. 67). , tr. R. Walzer, in S. H. Nasr and M. Aminrazavi (eds.), , vol. 1. ed., of existing things by the reality of is not like the englobing of particulars by a universal concept, and its hol ding valid for them the reality of is not a genus nor a species nor an accident since it is ). Rather its One essential feature is that is a simple affair ( This is is the reality and all other things take their reality from it. Thus, one should combine the two features that is the reality and that it is simple. One of the implications of the simplicity is that neither existence nor existents are compounds of any kind, e.g., form and matter. Analysable parts of existents Therefore we say: each of the realities of these species has a mode of exis- tence as a material body by which its me its individuals are multiplied, and in which they are found closely tied to one an- other in terms of space or time. In the same way, each of them has a specific in- Existence by itself is inclusive of all these meanings with its simplicity and unity.69 This is the , according to which, existence is a simple reality. The notion of simplicity is applied at this point in a Neoplatonic way, also meaning comprehensiveness . In the case of existence, which is de- signed as a reality that is manifested in varying degrees, this means that exis- tence comprehends different levels of existents. Each higher level of being com- englobing is of another kind of englobing which is not known are firm in knowledge ( Sumeyye Parildar I think the combination of these tw tion that existence is the principle of one and manymakes adrs idea of similar to Parmenidean idea of existence. adr accepts and writes about the Neoplatonic idea of cosmos, which starts with one emanating from one. However, the idea that is the principle of one and many rests on the onto- , which, in turn, rests on the idea that existence is one reality that is manifested at different levels. adrs is uni- conceptual existence in the mind. Concept is an intellectual existence and is adr lists the different cases of that the mind can imagine, such as , the non-existence of non-existence, ultimate non- ), ultimate non-existent ( ), non-existent in the mind, and all the impossibles, the ultimate unknown ( ), and so on. As soon as the mind can imagine or estimate these things, it can also make judgements on them. One cannot predicate them through common predi- ), as they are not about natures that are in the mind or in the external world. Thus, such predication is the first one ( Mull adrs evaluation of non-existents as having some share of existence makes one think that, in reality, adr rejects non-existence itself. Non-existence, according to him, is nothing but a concept produced by the mind. And, as a con- How about ultimate non-existence? Frb and the Mutazila say that non- existence is a thing. Avicenna says that the ultimate non-existent is not a thing. How about Mull adr? According to adr , as his principle of the primacy of Asfr Asfr Sumeyye Parildar tence of mental forms is through the soul, the soul is not a container of forms. It is rather the case that the soul consists of experiences, cognitive processes, and mental constructs. Existence, the soul and the sensation are similarly mani- My original claim was that adr endorses ontological and psychological monism due to the above-mentioned understanding of mental being. His onto- logical monism rests on four claims: 1) the primacy of existence and the claim that there is no reality beyond or other than existence; 2) existence is a simple varying intensities and grades. Existence is the principle of individuation and commonality, of one and many;4) the last claim, which I find most essential for his monism, is that existence is a single reality. Every existent shares the fea- adrs ontology and psychology are tightly interwoven in his theory of mental beings. The features of external existence, such as manifestation in dif- The psychic Man has the sensations of t he things by his essence, and the judgment on them by his essence. He does not need the natural [bodily] tools for his perception and act. So The reality of existence is dynamic and, in a sense, beyond the scope of the mind. As soon as the human being confronts the dynamic reality, it is frozen by the mind and quiddity is produced as a ment al construct. Verily, the qualifica- tion of quiddity by is an intelligible qualification, and an accidentality In this sense, the reality of things remains hidden from the human being. The fact that the sensible forms created in the human being are similarbut not Know that to all there correspond external realities; however, their names are unknown. In order to supply th ese names, we say the existence of this, the existence of that. Moreover, the totality of it necessitates in the mind a general concept. In contrast, differe nt things and quiddities have names and properties which are known. However, of each thing among all the different things, or real of everything, through correspondence with concepts and univ ersals used in logic, not in correspon- his perception of the external things from the sensibles [or sensory impressions] is either by tion of it is its very form and not by another fo rm, otherwise this will en tail a chain of double perceptive forms. Thus his essence by itself is for perceiving the visible objects of sight, the audible objects of ear, and likewise every species of sensibles. Th us he in his essence, for his essence, is [the sense of] hearing, sight, smell, taste, and touch. You have learned from what Sumeyye Parildar , London: Blackfriars in Conjunction with Eyre , ed. A. F. Al-Ahwn and Georges C. Anawati, , eds. al-b Qanawt, Mamd al-Khuayr, Fud al- De Anima Kitb al-Shif, ed. Fazlur Rahman, LondonNew York: Oxford Avicenna (2005) (Summer 2012 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL = http:// http://plato.stanford. Hasse, Dag N., Avicenna on abstraction, in: Robert Wisnovsky (ed.), , tr. S. H. Nasr, ed. Ibrahim Kalin, Provo, UT: Brigham Young University Press, adr al-Dn Shirz (Mull adr), , ed. S. J. shtiyn, with glosses of . M. H. Sabzawr, Tehran: Imperial Iranian Academy of Philosophy, adr al-Dn Shirz (Mull adr), Asfr, tr. Latimah-Parvin Sedley, David, The ideal of godlikeness, in G. Fine (ed.), ) ON CORPOREAL RESURRECTION al-Shrz, adr al-Dn, R. Luf, I. Amn, and F. Ummd, 3 edition, Beirt: Dr iy al-turth al-arab, 1981 lows the thing that casts it). Hence, the reality ( ) of every thing is its spe- cific kind of existence, not its quiddity . Existence is, therefore, an entified he- ), which cannot be imitated by any mental affair. It is not possible to refer to it otherwise than through pure knowledge of wit- The individuation ( ) of every thing is nothing else than its specific kind of existence ( ). Existence and individua- tion are unified in their essence, while they differ as concepts. The so-called individuating accidents ( ) are, in fact, only signs and concomitants of an individual existential he-ness, and even in this capacity they See: adr, , vol. 9, p. 185. Cf. Ibn Sns statement in the : It is not possi- ble to point to the First One except by pure intellectual knowledge ( ) (Ibn Sn, Janis Esots The individual unity of every th ingwhich is the same as its exis- tenceis not univocal and does not pertain to the same degree to all existents. On the contrary, like existence itself, it is ambiguous and analogically graded: in contiguous quantities, it manifests itself as continuity and uninterruptedness; in time and gradual affairs, as ceasing and self-renewal; in numbers, as actual mul- tiplicity; in natural bodies, as potential multiplicity. Furthermore, in separated tly than in material ones, because they have different capacity of existence. (The latter postulate seems to reflect the its receiver. As long as the soul is connected with the (natural) body, its sense perception is different from imagination, because the former requires external matter and specific preconditions, but the latter does not. But after the souls departure from the natural world the he experiences the psychic engendering ( ), in conformity with which he is an other-worldly psychic human being ( the object of Sending Forth (Awakening) ( ). Then he is gradually transferred from the psychic engendering to the intellectual one ( ), becoming an intellectual human being. (In a nutshell, adr rein- See: Ibn al-Arab, Muyi al-Dn, , ed. A. Aff, 2 edition, Tehrn: Int- Rahman, Fazlul, , Albany, NY: SUNY Press 1975, p. 255. Janis Esots man did not pose a question, this is the case, i.e., why adrs proof of , as presented in the represents a (masterly composed) summary of adrs philosophy. The import ance of the issue can only be under- stood properly if it is considered in the co ntext of adrs relationship with the audiences towards which his writings were directed and his full awareness of Asfr with the Active Intellect as intellection of Pure Good disagrees with the Aristo- telian understanding of as conceptualization of sense experiences, thus revealing the contradictoriness of his appr oach. In any case, imagination is not a See, e.g.: Ibn al-Arab, , Beirut: Dr dir, n.d., vol. 1, pp. 304 See: Ibn Sn, , ed. A.Nrn, Tehrn: Intishrt-i muassisa-yi Apparently, adr refers to the famous theory of adr al-Dn al-Dashtak al-Shrz (828/1425903/1497) (discussed in the latters ) on the twofold connection of the soul with the natural bodythrough the animal spirit and directly with the parts of the body. While the first connection is destroyed by natu ral death, the second, as Dashtak holds, remains intact. Dashtak believes that every par ticle of the natural b ody is somehow marked by the soul during their coexistence. By this m ark, different parts of the destroyed body will Janis Esots estimative faculty, which perceives partic ular meanings by its essence and cor- when a human being dies and imagines his essence as [an affair which is] separated from this world, and [mistakenl y] identifies it as that very human be- ing which is dead and buriedthe on e which died in his form[in the same manner as in dream visions he witnesses himself in the same form in which he exists in this world, and witnesses the affairs by true witnessing through his in- and finds his body in the grave, and perceives the pain that afflicts the body as a sensible punishment, in keeping with what the true Laws tell us, this is the suffering of the Grave ( . But, if he is a blessed one, he imagines what is promised by the Law in an agreeable form, in conformity with the objects of his beliefs, such as garden s, rivers, parks, page-boys, houris, cups of the allotted [substance] (i.e., wine. .), and this is the reward of the Grave Grave is the first other-worldly stage of the souls substantial evolution, at which the soul continues to identify itself with its natural body, in spite of its actual separation from the latter, and imagi nes that through this natural body it receives sensible reward and sensible p unishment for its this-worldly acts per- formed in conformity with its beliefs or contrary to them. Thus, the grave, the reward and punishment are imaginal and illu sory affairs that exist only in the soul. If the latter did not identify itself with the natural body and did not be- lieve in posthumous reward and pun ishment, it would not experience them. Gradually the intensity of the images of the Grave fades away and the soul be- comes aware that its estimative faculty ha s made an error, identifying itself with the physical shape of the dead body. It re alizes that, as a simple spiritual affair, it is all things that its scope of intensity allo ws it to encompass. This decrease of the intensity with which the soul perceives itself as its fo rmer natural body is called The awakening consists in the souls co ming out of the dust of these shapes, like an embryo comes out of its strong Shrz, adr al-Dn al-, , 2 vols., ed. M. Khjav, Beirut: Muassasa , part 9, p. 219. According to Khj av, the last paragraph is a paraphrase of a passage from Ghazls (What Must Be Kept from the adr, , vol. 9, p. 219. Cf. Ibn al-Arab s statement: The period of , in rela- tion to the last configurati on, corresponds to the womans ca rrying the embryo in her womb , part 3, p. 250 (the English translation by Chittick in idem, , Albany, NY: SUNY Press, 1997, p. 351). When the time for the Rising comes, man wakes up from the sleep of the Grave and, willingly or not, directs himself towards God. Rising from the Grave, i.e., ceasing to identify oneself with the natural body with its wishes and appe- tites, is one of the essential stages of t he soul and an indispensable phase of its substantial development. Since it is an e ssential affair, its occurrence cannot be prevented by accidental obstacles (such as habits and attachments, referred to by Ibn Sn as bodily shapes). However, the presence of the latter in the soul can make it perceive the event of Rising (and the essential motion in general) as The Holy Janis Esots [also] sees the compound individual pos- sessors of positions (i.e., the natural bodies. Shrz, adr al-Dn al-, , ed. M. Khjav, Tehran: Intishrt-i Mawl, The English translation of the verse belongs to Chittick: idem, [then] understands the meaning of Hi mountains. Say: my Lord will uproot them and scatter them as dust. He will leave them as plains, smooth and level. Nothing crooked or curved wilt thou see in their place (20:105107). And on that day he sees the fire of Gehenna en- compassing the unbelievers (i .e., the natural existents. .) (9:49) and sees ] whose fuel is men and stones (2:24),29 and [how] the seas are boiling over with a swell.30 The vision of the Rising, generally speaking, is the vision of oneness of the true existence (the Real) and of the illusoriness of its limitations. Upon a closer examination, however, one finds that what is at issue is not an absolute individual oneness (according to which, all is He ), but a sort of oneness-in- manyness and manyness-in-oneness ( This seems to have been the dominant intuition of the ecstatic (in particular, Persian) century at least. According to some accounts, the expression was first employed by Abdallh An r, but, apparently, it was Jm w ho managed to word it in the (Abd al-Rahmn Jm, Lawi, in: M. M. T. Majlis, , with the attachment of Jms and F. Irqs , Tehran: Nr-i Fima Publishers, 1996, p. 62. Cf. Chitticks translationW. C. Chittick, Janis Esots tual connections with the natural world, turning their aspirations towards the truly real intellectual existence and putting their trust into it, but still remain in this world in the aspect of their bodily frames (or the animal soul in general) can In the , adr identifies the experience of the Rising as a change of the this-worldly configuration into the other-worldly one or as a change/replace- ment of existence ( ), which can occur both before and after natural death (in the former case it is called voluntary death We have lifted the veil, and to day thy sight is piercing (50:22) because of the change of their (t he mystics and the risen ones. .) this- worldly configuration into an other-worldly one. And when their configuration, and their hearing, sight an d [other] senses are change d into [the other-worldly] hearing, sight and senses, [simultaneous existents that are [found] in the heavens an d on the earth, because they also have And through this change in existence, According to the Quran, when Abraham, w ho had come to believe in the True-and-One God, destroyed the images of his tribal gods, hi s tribesmen sentenced him to death in fire, but ! Be thou cool and (a two fires represent nothing but certain ranges of perceptual existence ( Asfr Janis Esots renewal of their skins and transformation of their bodies, and their turning from one form into another because their na tures [manifest themselves as] material tablished that the actions and affec- tions of material faculties are finite, the refore ceasing and ch ange are inevitable in them. Then, change of bodies and tr ansformation of matters must inevitably have its cause in a circula r movement produced by ce lestial bodies, which en- compass the engendering and corrupting bodiespossessors of directions. And the judgment concerning the inhabitants of the Fire is [made] in accordance with what Gods command gives them through the locomotive faculty of the Furthest Body, which compels it to move and [thr ough] the luminaries (i.e., the fixed .) [that remain] fixed with respect to the travelling of the seven bright As for the inhabitants of the Garden , they do not experi ence this kind of change, transformation, engendering an d corruption, because their configuration is lifted above the natural configuration and its properties, and their movements and actions are of different kind, wherefore they do not experience tiredness and exhaustion, nor are their deeds afflicte d by weariness, because their movements and actions are not corporeal, but are like operations of estimative faculty ( and movements of inner consciousness ( ) that occur without [entailing] tiredness, weariness, exhaustion and fatig ue, since, with respect to them (the in- habitants of the Garden. .), the heavens and their movements are rolled up, due to their standing on the right side and possessing a station at which time and place are rolled up. In their time, the past and the future of this [our] time sensible affairs, except that, although they are sensible affairs, they are not ma terial and natural ones, but their forms are perceptual ones, whose entified existence is their very sensibility ( ), and everything that is in this Gard en has a psychic existence Despite this, in the world of the gardens self-r enewals take place [which manifest them- selves as] engendering of forms of the Ga rden, [emerging] not from material oc- casions, but from the active direction s of the soul and Gods tasks ( And thus it has been establishe d that the principle of changes in the horizons (i.e., .) takes its beginning in the world of souls, and that the configuration of the gardens is the configuration of souls, and that, inside Apparently, adr means that each human soul possesses its own imaginal Garden and Janis Esots original idea apparently belongs to Suhr award), also pertain to the world of Imagination, but differ from those of ordina ry people in their greater intensity, due to which they can externalize these visi ons and make other p eople witn ess them. Whoever has understood how God exer cises His power with respect to the existence of imagination, an d [with respect to] what is found by the soul in a single instant, such as huge bodily forms an d [gigantic] dimensions, and their at- the corporealization of spirits ( ) and the assumption of bodily forms by the intentions, and the immediate bringing to [ones] presence of the object al-yt nation or the Garden of Soul, who, then, inhabits the Garden of Intellect? but before this their state is an intermediate perfection ( Janis Esots ), but their bodies are tormented by the torments and pains of 43 The symbolism of the passage from the , to me, is transparent: The twenty-second chapter (The Bezel of the Wisdom of Intimacy in the Word of Elias) of Ibn al-Arabs is likely to have been adrs direct source of inspiration. Ibn al-Arab writes: The mystics here appear as if they [still] were in the form of this world, due to what pertains to them of its properties. But [in actual fact] God, the Most High, has [already] changed them, on the in side, into the other-worldly configuration ( al-ukhrawiyya and, by their [true inner] form, they are not known to anyone except the one to whom God reveals them through his insight, and he understan ds. And there is no knower of God, [know- ing Him] through His self-disclosure, who has not been changed into the other-worldly con- figuration and has not been gathe red in the world and risen in his grave, and he sees what you do not see and witnesses what you do not witness (Ibn al-Arab, , part 1, p. 186. Cf. C. Daglis translation in: Muhyi al-Dn Ibn al-Arab,  ,  [  ]                     ,     -      [      ],     ,     (.     ,                         #   ,       , !   [  ]     (       [$   ]  !         (: !  . )   &                    '    ',   [ ]       (  !     (       :  -  -   ,       . . ., 2004.     - *     [ ]         ! ',                         ,       -        [ ] !  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( . ) [] [,      !         ] ,   []   ,      ,     , 72. 9         [  !  ,   -      ],       ,   -  ,           [  ]       #  ,     H "   /    &..   +  ,      "*   '  - �#     +    3. !+     ,  - � $ M  @  , , * *    -Z (.: , . 244, ��&..    ',    +,       - ?   +   +       ?    Abd al-Razzq Lhij (d. 1072/1661) was an eminent philosopher and im- portant scholar of the afawid period, a disciple and son-in-law of Mull adr, . Lhij was very devoted to adr, as a number From the following Abd al-Razzqs poem, it follows that adr was buried The article represents an abridged version of the chapter Abd al-Razzq Lhij from Gholam Hossein Khadris book Masmiyya madrasa for many years. He was succeeded at the Masmiyya by another student of adr, Musin Fay, after whom the madrasa later became In a copy of Q Sad Qumms (a manuscript of which is housed in the central library of Tehran University), it is stated that it S. J. shtiyn (ed.), , Tehran, 1972- Gholam Hossein Khadri The scholarly virtues and achievements of this man have not been appreci- ated, because of the dissemination of the works of Mr Dmd and Mull It is well known that he believed the verbal indication to be an essential af- al-sha Most of his works deal with philosophy and . Some of them are writ- 12) The and the Lhij, ed., Tehran, 1372 S.H./ Gholam Hossein Khadri 6) The (glosses on Nar al-Dn ss commentary on Ibn Sns ). There are copies of this work in the libraries of Majlis and stn-i Qu ds. QurbnAl Muammad Muqaddam wrote In order to avoid the possibility of concluding that the principality of exis- tence entails the uncreatedness of quiddity, Lhij asserts the createdness of quiddity. If we say, he argues, that qui ddity is created accidentally through the In the second part of the atedness of existence, denying the princi pality of quiddity, the homonymity of existence and the addition of existence to qui ddity in the external world (accord- ing to which, existence represents a sort of being resting on quiddity). In this The reason why we deny that existen ce possesses a true instance is that this may lead to an assumption that it rests on quiddity outside, as an accident rests on its substrate. The impossibility of this is self-evident, as it was shown above. However, if we assert that existence is identical with quiddity outside and added to it in the mind, then there is no room for fear of such impossibility. Think Gholam Hossein Khadri Things In the We omit the section on the individual unity of existence, which almost entirely consists Since motion consists in the bodys grad ual attainment of a state, and all its possible states are divided into ten categor ies, motion inevitably occurs in one of these categorieshowever, not in all of them, because motion in substance is impossible, as substance is an essentia l constituent of the body, and motion in essential constituents is impossible, sinc In particular, by shtiyn in his introduction to the Gholam Hossein Khadri In the , Lhij dismisses as invalid the principle of unity of the in- ) and the intellected ( ). After quoting Ibn Sns proof, The claim of unity of the intellecting and the intellected has gained popular- and some of them have endorsed it, believing that Aristotle also accepted it. I did not find a satisfactory proof in any of their dis- He also argues that Ibn Sn did not actually hold the proof in favour of this contains a chapter on the World of Likeness, in which Lhij strongly criticizes this theory and attempts to invalidate it. His criticism Know that some philosophersin par ticular, Shihb al-Dn Suhraward, the establisher of the wisdom of Illumination in the Islamic era, claim that the an- cient Iranian kingssuch as Kay Khus raw and those of his kinpossessed the wisdom, and that the same was the case with the pre-Aristotelian Greek sages, whereas Aristotle opposed them a nd developed the wisdom of a different ), but possess no matter. Thus, the inhabi- tants of the World of the Intellect po ssess neither matter nor magnitude, whereas the dwellers of the sensible world possess both matter and magnitude; the in- habitants of the intermediate world, in turn, possess magnitude, but are free from matter, as this is the case with imaginal forms. However, imaginal forms exist in Each existent of the purely immaterial and material worlds has a likeness in this intermediate world, in cluding movements and rests, positions and disposi- tions, tastes and smells and other accidents This world is also called the world of Imagination, dis contiguous imagination ( world of the Isthmus ( Gholam Hossein Khadri patible with the apparent meaning of thei r words and, in addition, contrary to and experiencing pain from their opposite s. In turn, bodily delight and pain oc- Gholam Hossein Khadri cur in keeping with the necessity of the re tention of promise and threat that en- The Muslim sagesor, rather, all di vine sagesteach about two resurrec- tions. However, in the matters of corporea l resurrection, they are mere imitators, contenting themselves with endorsing the mn sopher, theologician and litterateur, who used to sign his poems as , was a student of Mr Findirisk and the leader of a philosophical movement that developed within the framework of the The article represents an abridged version of the chapter Rajab Al Tabrz wa shgir- dn-  from Gholam Hossein Khadris book Gholam Hossein Khadri Tabrzs students esteemed him highly For example, Q Sad Qumm calls him the finest of the saints and a noble, accomplished divine man, thus Rajab Al Tabrz was the leader of a powerful movement opposing adrs Transcendent Philosophy. One of the reasons of the slow dissemination of The overwhelming majority of philosophers hold that the subject of philoso- phy is the existent as such, or existence considered . According to Tabrz, It is preferable to describe the subject of philosophy as a thing, not as the Tabrz argues that both quiddity and existence are really present outside, one of them being predicated to another and appearing to it as an accident. Of course, this opinion differs from the position of those who claim that both exis- tence and quiddity are principal, because the latter group holds that existence and quiddity are initially contained within each other, whereas Tabrz and his Since, considered as such, quiddity is only identical to itself, the quiddity that exists outside is either a quiddity that is not existent, because the quiddity as such cannot be anything else (as it was established above, though we assumed that it exists, which leads to an absurdity) S.J. shtiyn (ed.), , vol. 2, pp. 463 Gholam Hossein Khadri posterior to it. Therefore, quiddity is made before the making of existence. Thus, it has been established that both quiddity and existence are made by one and the same The causal nexus is essentially estab Gholam Hossein Khadri , Tabrz attempts to rule out the possibility of mental exis- tence, making numerous objections to the statements of those scholars who en- During the act of perception, the s oul perceives the essences of all things (i.e., their external he-nesses, not their forms). However, the particular and sen- sible affairs are perceived by the soul and its tools, wher eas the universal natures of the existents are percei ved without the intermediacy of these toolsinstead, the soul perceives them through a singl e faculty, and not through many. But it Tabrz proposes psychology and epis temology, which focus on two funda- mental conceptsnamely, those of the illuminative knowledg e and presential knowledge. Thus, he fills the philosophi cal vacuum that is created because of know the things and existents in their e ssential singularity and presence, without the intermediacy of a form or a concept that provides it with the conception of Hence, the soul can dispense with the m ultiple faculties, of which, according to 15 Gods Essence is not Identical with His Attributes The attributes of the Necessary Existent are not identical with His essence. Life and death are natural phenomena. Everyone is familiar with them: all humans are alive, some non-human beings ar e also alive (we call them animals), Those two statements appear obvious, self-evident and even commonplace: it looks like there is no need to prove them. What calls for certain elaboration is not the biological fact itself, but rather the logic of dealing with it; I mean the way we expect it to enter the domain of our reasoning. The question that I have in mind is the following. Can we expect any given culture ever developed by humanki nd to discuss life and death in terms of the life/death dichotomy (provided this culture is interested in such discussion)? We can expect all cultures to regard life and death as universal natural biological phenomena, but is there anything to suggest that they all will universally use the same logic of the life/death dichotomy to theorize about This question calls for further clarifi cation. Fundamental biological facts are universal for human beings. Does this not apply to logic as well? We are in- clined to qualify logic as a universal science, since it deals with universal forms of reasoning and constructing arguments. E.g., we can say that anything at all is either animate or inanimate, and there seems to be no exception to that obvious fact. The law of the excluded middle has dichotomy logic of reasoning about lif e and death as universal biological phe- Our statement anything is either animate or inanimate is a perfect univer- sal truth. Again, there is no doubt ab Andrey Smirnov discussed as the mortality/immortality opposition. Humanity is corrupted and mortal after the original sin; death comes as an interruption of the earthly life, sent in Greek philosophy. Platonic idealism supposes a clear-cut dividing line Here comes proper, in the immediate sense of the term. This term applies, strictly speaking, only to the Christian worldview. I am trying to expand its limits. Is there a archy of values E.g.: Do not store up for yourselves treas ures on earth, where moth and rust destroy, and where thieves break in and steal. But store up for yourselves treasures in heaven, where moth and rust do not destroy, and where th ieves do not break in and steal. For where your Two cities have been formed by two loves: the earthly by the love of self, even to the contempt of God; the heavenly by the love of G od, even to the contempt of self. The former, in a word, glories in itself, the latter in the Lord. For the one seeks glory from men; but the greatest glory of the other is God, the witness of conscience (St. Augustine, Book XIV, Chap. 28 Of The Nature of the Two Cities, the Earthly and the Heavenly, transl. Marcus Dodds, in Augustine, Andrey Smirnov or pronounce the same words, but rather to proceed from the same logic of reasoning. It is also natural for a rese archer to expect another culture to be- have the same way his or her mother cu lture does. A student of foreign lan- guage naturally tries to imitate his or her mother tongue, and in the same man- ner we naturally follow the hermeneutic ha bits of our mother culture when we explore a foreign culture, and try to understand how it causes the world to When we shift to the domain of medieval Islamic thought, we find that dis- course about life and death in terms of the life/death dichotomy is present there. Islamic authors speak of The life/death dichotomy is there not only in the Qurn and the Sunna (the Traditions), but in early Islamic (happiness/torment) dichotomy An oft-repeated tradition (see al-Bukh r 4453 and other) tells us that, after the Judgment is over, death (resembling a horn-eyed ram) will be brought forth. Dwellers of paradise and dwellers of hell will be asked if they know it. They will say: Yes, it is death, and then it will be slaughtered. After that they will never ) in their omy, we find and : two basic oppositions of a non- is an abbreviation of the expression life, by which our life on earth is designated. is an abbreviation of , the other life, meaning human destiny in the hereafter, i.e., af- ter the Resurrection and Judgment take pl opposition is an opposition of this and opposition is paralleled by the opposition. means religion, and may be rendered as a the here-and-now [life]/reli- religion is, from the Isla mic point of view, the only true teaching about hereafter, it is in fact us ed in its stead, and in that To put our discussion of Islamic understanding of Some idea about where the mainstream of Islamic thinking on matters of life and death lies will be given by the following figures. I used the digitalized encyclo- frequency of the and oppositions in (Qurn commentaries) (traditions and their commentaries) literat ure (569 titles). I got 26 and 15,521 hits respectively. The frequency of usage speaks op- position is found almost in all of the 15 thou sand hits within the same phrase, while the opposition, only on the same page and often in very different contexts, which in fact does not make up an opposition. The (life/death) opposition resulted in 252 hits. These figures may be somewhat modified by different techniques of search; e.g., if we non-dichotomic opposition Andrey Smirnov orders angels to bow before Adam and acknowledge his highest rank. This is a starting point for Satans revolt, as he considers such a bow to be a clear viola- a bow means worship and adoration, while only God, and not any of His crea- This angelic bow to Adam places man on an elevated grade very close to God; even dangerously close, for man finds himself somewhere on the dividing Iblis: he refused and was haughty (Qurn 2:34 transl. Abdallah Yousuf Ali); see also 15:28 Islam forbids to bow to a nyone but God. There is a well- known tradition related by Ibn anbal which testifies to that. When Muammad tamed a violent camel by merely appearing before its eyes and made it sit down in front of him, his companions said that they, rather than , the Third Thing, uniting the first two, i.e., God and the world, which was developed in the (Drawing of Circles), and later in (Revelations of Mecca) and the (Bezels of Wis- We did indeed offer the Trust to the H eavens and the Earth and the Mountains; but they refused to undertake it, being afraid and foolish (Qurn 33:72, transl. Abdallah Yousuf Ali). The last words (unjust and foolish) , obedience with reward [for following the Law] and punish- verse, great mountains and mighty skies, rejected Gods offer, and only the physically humble human being accepted it without hesitation. Thus the human being, the only creature in the universe, accepted responsibility and accountabil- ity for following Gods prescriptions and prohibitions ( So, from the Qurnic perspective, the Law is not imposed on a human being as a hard and unwelcome burden. On the contrary, man chooses to follow the Law and to take upon himself the respon sibility of it. This free choice makes Just as God and the world share nothing, , earthly life, and , the other life, have nothing in common. Nothing on earth can This of course entails the question of , predestination, and its relation to human capacity of free act. That problem was discussed Andrey Smirnov two opposites share nothing and have nothing in common, how at all can we the other life, share nothing substantially. The process of writing, which links the writing hand to the written signs, is not a substance, and when we es- tablish such a uniting link we still can hold that the two opposite sides of a proc- Putting it in Aristotles perspective, we dis cover that the active and the passive sides of common. Interestingly enough, among the highes t genera there is no category that would en- able us to grasp the process , as distinct from its active and passive sides: process as people are those who are not diverted by their other life ( ), nor by their nearest life from their other life. sib is renowned in Islamic culture for the claim he made about the necessity to constantly control ones soul and a ll its movements and desires, and to regard it from Gods point of view, every moment giving an account of it , as Islamic authors put it) is, of course, ad- (motivation for the other life) is relevant to balance their natural obsession with earthly things. An excellent wording for this attitude is found in Ibn Kath the Qurn. Elaborating on 62:9 and citing similar verses, he writes: The Su-            , Bayr t: Dr al-kutub al-ilmiyya, 1998, p. 60; repeated in the same wording by ed. Bayr t: Dr al-kitb al-arab, 1405 h., v. 10, p. 88, then 1423 h., v. 2, p. 282 and later al-Sh , Bayr t: Dr al-kutub O ye who believe! When the call is proclaimed to prayer on Friday, hasten earnestly to the Remembrance of God, and leave off business: that is the best for you if you but knew! Consider the following Qurnic verse: What is the life of this world ( ) but play and amusement? But best is the home in the hereafter ( ), for those who are righteous. Will you not then understand? (Qurn 6: 32, transl. Abdallah Yousuf Ali). is called Andrey Smirnov and not for an exclusive accent on one of them, perfectly fits in the general per- opposition as well, where earthly life is the outward, and the other life, the in- This means that both lives are necessary, and neither of them denies the other. They are not of a dichotomic character, and man is not urged to choose   !"# $ %&'  %( )*   !"# %' +  , $ &* -.   , * -. Jafar and are not subordinated but rather coordinated, so it is absurd to imagine that suffering in earthly life brings bliss in the hereafter. On the con- and are never contraposed in that respect; rather, there exists ) in this life deprives him of it in the those who wear silk or use gold and silver tableware in their earthly life will be forbidden to use it in the life to come. This only stresses the opposi- aybn (d.189 h.) as an argument for his thesis that (acquir- ing [a bliss in the hereafter]) means not only obeying the Law ( ing obligations but also cooperation ( ) for the sake of such obedience. The latter includes any work performed in (earthly life) and connected, one way or another, with , e.g., tailors craft, because one has to be dressed points out, when he said: Do not abuse earthly life ( ), for what a perfect riding creature ( ) earthly life is for a believer to take him to the hereafter ). Al-Sh aybn adds: A man asked Ab Dh arr (a companion of the s, a famous anaf faqih (d. 483 h.), refers to this Malik 1542: , Mir: Dr iy al-turth al-arab. v. 2, p. 846; ), and the excellent reward kh aybn, Muammad b. al-asan, q: Abd al-Hdi ar n, Andrey Smirnov tradition in his voluminous when he stresses that it is a mistake to hold that earthly deeds, like growing pl ants and trees or constructing buildings, imply love for earthly life and, consequently, diminish the reward in the hereaf- ter: on the contrary, agriculture, construction, poultry and animal husbandry, azl point out, human life The general life-preserving attitude of Islam embraces not only human be- ings, but all living creatures as well. No animal may be killed just for the hell of it, for amusement. Man has the right to hunt and kill wild creatures only in order to feed himself if he cannot gain food in any other way, and only inas- is prohibited. Moreover, insignificant insect s like ants or evil and harmful creatures like snakes may be killed only if they in fact threaten human beings, and not out of just in case considerations. The same preserving principle em- braces dead stock as well, even on enemy territory in case of war: a Muslim army has the right to destroy anything on ly inasmuch as required by war needs, but no more. The general expression of this principle and attitude is the follow- Earthly life and the other life are not of a single process; in the same manner the soul and the body are not regarded as being poles apart. This attitude is gr ounded in one of the basic Islamic theses about human nature ( ) as sound and not in the least affected by Adams sin. Human flesh is not prone to evil, if kept within its natural bounds, and those limits are stipulated by Islamic law. The flesh and the body are not under suspi- cion, they need not be tamed or suppressed. This is one of the reasons why Is- lam rejects monachism. Body and soul are typically regarded as the two sides, the outward ( ) and the inward ( ), of the process of performing deeds I speak of the norms of the Law, not about their implementation; as anywhere, they (earthly life/the other life) dichotomy does not in the least mean that they are mixed u p in Islamic doctrine or that they are not n cited to illustrate it. Once al-arab, v. 4, p. 1836). But differen- tiation does not mean dichotomy, and it is hardly possible to sp eak of a secular/ecclesiastic dichotomy in Islamic culture, where we do no t find secular power opposed to church power, canon law as opposed to secular law, or secular ar Andrey Smirnov two sides in such a manner that flawless (approved by Islamic doctrine, law and ). This process of -transition is paralleled by mutual movement of God and man movement possible. Earthly life and the future life are opposites, but they are both necessary and therefore cherished, tion is reached as stability and fix edness of this balance and correspondence, and not as an exclusive development of one of the dichotomic opposites. This The Neoplatonic reading of the soul-to-b ody relation was widespread in Islamic culture (Greek-inspired philosophy) t The following contribution intends to highlight philosophical aspects in We- bers treatment of monotheism. In many respects the treatment of monotheism is quite complex and cannot be treated, properly, in a short essay. However, we intend to present some philosophical within the framework of global histor y had world historical consequences in human history. We are not dealing, at this point, with theological contents or belief, rather, with the philosophic import and practical consequences that en- sued from a specific form of belief or belief system, namely monotheism. Of course, we all know that religions such as Judaism, Christianity and Islam, rep- resent a belief system called monotheism. In our treatment, at present, we are less concerned with the specifics of beliefs of these respective belief systems. We are concerned with the ideological and pragmatic effects of monotheism upon world events in human affairs. We specifically, at this point, focus on the ancient Egyptian form of monotheism. Thus, we ask: To what extend did mono- theism, as an ideology and belief system, affect, not to say participate in the construction of world history on a global scale? This question is not put by We- ber in such an explicit manner, rather, Weber, at first, was focused on the rela- Ernest Wolf-Gazo proposed that we find the roots of capitalism in protestant Christianity; others hold that Weber is guilty of Eurocentri sm. Both contentions are ideological in witnessing a curious, disturbing and paradoxical situation, viz. a resurgence of monotheistic belief systems and life styles amidst a revolution in communica- tions technology that seems to contradict formal rationality and sends shock waves through the minds of those who thought that the hard-earned results of the classic enlightenment are irreversible. No doubt, Weber and the men and women who produced first-class literature and thinking a century ago, are help- ing contemporary thinkers, especially in the social sciences and humanities, to shed some light into the dark tunnels of irrational forces at work in the new cen- tury. All road signs pointed towards t he Janus-face of monotheism, but the exact location was never spelt out, since t he double nature of monotheismon the one hand, its irrational forces, on the other hand, its formal rationalitywas not religious, the unconscious or irrational . Gesammelte Aufstze zur Religion ssoziologie (RS I). Tbingen: UTB 1986. Volume 1, edited by Weber himself and dedicated to his wife Marianne Weber, shortly Ernest Wolf-Gazo the discerning eye reading the following proclamations by Weber that introduce the first volume of his sociology of religion sees these conflicts, where the This article, then, focuses for the sake of expedience and space, on the Pre- liminary Remarks (Vorbemerkung, RS I, 116), the Introduction (Einleitung, RS I, 237275), and the Intermediat Constant discussions in progress about is sues relevant to the new century and its new political, economic, and social forms and structures formed the centerpiece Ernest Wolf-Gazo by photos of Freuds working desk and o ffice with the famous couch that reveal a keen interest in ancient Egyptian deiti es and culture. Max Weber very much im- mersed himself in this tr end of European adaptation of non-European cultures. Speaking merely of Eurocentrism, as we find it spelt out in ture of the late 20 century, reduces the complexity of intellectual life, especially in the early 20 century Europe. Thus, as we dis cuss the specifics of the world historical significance of the Janu s-faced monotheism revealing irrational forces on one of its faces and formal rationality on the other, we should consider . Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft. 5. Auflage. Tbingen: Mohr Siebeck 1980. Ernest Wolf-Gazo cific form and pattern of formal rational behavior. We can find rationality or capitalism in many epochs of world history; many who have read Weber seem to have missed that point since the common version of reading Webers texts had been produced. Far from it, Weber was very precise in pointing out that a specific form of modern capitalist organiza tion, as well as a specific form of while the practice of mummification and pyramid building functioned as links Ernest Wolf-Gazo Plato marveled at the advanced knowledge of the Egyptians, although the ancient Greeks, as we can read in some passages from Platos , made fun of those priests safeguarding the temples al ong the Nile Valley. A careful reading of Weber immediately gives the reader a sens e that he was very much aware of the historical literature about the ancient E gyptians and followed researches on an- cient Egypt in personal conversations and discussions with his colleagues in the famous Eranos Circle. Needless to say, a famous photograph of Sigmund Freud in his study at Bergstrasse 22 in Vienna shows the master amongst numerous statu- D . B his wife Nefertiti and their children. The art sociologist Arnold Hauser, following W eber, pointed to the naturalism in art, introduced by Akhtenaten as one of the fi rst revolutionaries in art history. Thus, we see that the notion of monotheism car ries its consequences far beyond simply Ernest Wolf-Gazo one type of rationality produced in the West or one type of capitalism emerging in European history. Again, what makes the hi storical situation of monotheism tense is that its belief system produces rational structures that refer back to the oneness of the belief. We can see this very nicely in the Amarna episode, in which a sud- den shift in the conception of deity, from a pantheon of gods to a singular concept of deity in the form of a sun-disc, reduces the cultur al legacy of rituals, cultic activity and festivals to an abstract conc ept aligned along the lines of a political autocracy. We could also express this in a different way, saying: Show me your god, or gods, and will I tell you what kind of political structure you have. The whole story of monotheism ha . Ancient Egypt: An Introduction. Cambridge, MA: Cambridge University Press, . Georg Lukacs, Karl Mannheim und der Sonntagskreis. The main aim of this short paper is to discuss, in a brief and succinct way, a rather important pitfall in the ideas of one of the most well-known modern Muslim scholars, Abdolkarim Soroush. To observe brevity, I have refrained from developing many related themes which are introduced in the paper. My A version of this paper was presented to the annual (An Encounter with gious discourses in Iran and in many other Islamic communities around the Dr Soroushs ideas have not only scholars and Muslim intellectuals but have also educated and enlightened large numbers of Muslims who are neither schola rs nor intellectuals in the technical The list of the great achievements of Dr Soroush contains many prominent entries. However, one item which requires especial mention is the role played by him in a movement known as the Religious or Islamic Intellectual Move- ment. It is in the context of this notion that I would like to expand my critical The Islamic Intellectual Movement is an important phenomenon with a long history. However, its roots in modern times go back to the first encounters be- tween a triumphant West and a weakened Islamic civilization in the early nine- The main question which has exercised the minds of great representatives of this movement during the past two centuries has been, How to make Islam Soroushs main contribution to this debate has been the introduction of critical rationalism as a powerful tool for providing a satisfactory answer to the above question. Critical rationalism is an idea that Soroush has learnt from Karl Popper and tried, with considerable skill, to graft onto the indigenous doc- As a Muslim critical rationalist, Soroush has urged his fellow Muslims to, Ali Paya Paper presented by Soroush to a one-day Religion & Democ- racy, Tehran, Ministry of Science, Research and Technology, Thursday, the 2 of December, 2004. I chaired this conference. A brief account of the conference could be found at the fol- lowing website (http://justworldnews.org/archives/001019.html) which belongs to Helena Cobban who was present at the conference. I have used some parts of her report in my paper. A full, Persian version of the papers presented at the above conference and another related event few days earlier at the University of Mashhad, has been edited by Abdulaziz Sachedina agency ( For Poppers views and his extensive biblio graphy, visit http://www.eeng.dcu.ie/~tkpw/. For an intellectual account of his ideas, see David Miller, , Ashgate, 2006. So- roush has played a significant role in introduc ing Poppers ideas to the Iranian public and intellectuals. For Poppers impact on Iranian intellectuals and Soroushs role in introducing Poppers views, see Ali Paya and Mohammad G hanei-rad, The Philosopher and the Revolu- tionary State: How Karl Poppers Ideas Shaped the Views of Iranian Intellectuals, In recent years and in deali Ali Paya own intention, not only paves the way for the creation of an undemocratic situa- For Poppers discussion of these points, see his Ali Paya And this is a plain fact that Soroush, himself an advocate of cognitive ap- roushs project which are many and varied. I shall limit myself to those aspects Joseph Conrad in one of his lesser known novels called masterfully explores, among other things, the disastrous consequences of the overwhelming influence of uncritic al mystical views in the context of Eyes Ali Paya role and status of reason as the final arbiter in matters epistemologic have been recognized. A typical example of such trends within the wider context of Is- Despite the fact that, in many mystical lit eratures, it appears that the mystics give the absolute role to love and demote reason to a lower st atus, it is not difficult to find interesting and tantalising examples to the contrary in which the supreme importance of reason has been acknowledged and endorsed. Admittedl y, research in this field is woefully inadequate. The present author has come across some interesting cases in the of Hafiz. However, such cases need to be discussed in the context of a separate paper. Nevertheless, it is the present authors firm view that a thorough research in this direction, namely, finding examples in The article seeks to answer the question regarding the necessity of compara- tive philosophy posed as: Is there any ne cessity for comparative studies of dif- ferent historical traditions, cultures and religions? The definite reply of the arti- cle to the question is: Absolutely yes. The article summarizes its explanation of he most famous Japanese scholar in the field of Islamic studies as well as comparative philosophy. His works on the Bijan Abdolkarimi namely to attain a common and single framew ork underlying different Oriental religious and mystical traditions in order to respond to the contemporary spiri- tual crises. The route taken by Izutsu highly resembles the path which his col- But the question is: what justifies the existence of comparative studies in general and the project of comparative philosophy in Corbins thoughtor in Bijan Abdolkarimi not; we were Muslims, but at present we are not. And we all must become con- Death Bijan Abdolkarimi ity appreciates man for that which is not in him. It means that there is no consid- ject itself into a critical problem. So far, the subject has realized itself as I Bijan Abdolkarimi even correctly apply the expression I or have a positive sense of it when we Turning to earlier historical traditi ons and attempts to understand their non- ourselves from the reductionistic, natura listic, materialistic, as well as psycholo- Corbin, Henry, Jad Hatem Die Weltalter Munich, Beck, 1946, p. 218 ( Les ges du monde , tr. P. David, , Stuttgart, Cotta, 18561861, VII, p. 35 ( uvres mtaphysiques . Comprenons que la divinit ne peut se connatre VII, p. 359. Il doit tre clair qu e le terme de rvlation dans les exclut une Ibid., p. 438. Dans les Jad Hatem tit absolue, mtaphoriquement dit: de la Nuit originelle . Or la simple mise en Schelling prcisera que sans la force contractile, lamour lui-mme, en raison de sa ten- , II, p. 310. Jai prfr quiddit un autre terme (qui comporterait celui dessence que je rserve ) car il arrive Ibn Arab de remplacer par Fixe ne signifie pas seulement ce qui est oppos au changeant, mais marque aussi ce qui est Jad Hatem ), en un tre qui englobe tout pour ce quil est qualifi par lexis- , III, p. 68. Si Ibn Arab avait fait du Nom cach un lment initialement op- pos la manifestation pour finir par en devenir l auxiliaire, il et rejoint la position de Schel- ling. Mais il et fallu, pour cela, des amnagements inconnu [variante la plus rpandue: cach], jai aim tre connu, jai pour cela Jad Hatem par tous les cts, son mouvement du nant de fixit lexistence tait un  -  -   (605673    ,      -    -,        . !  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"  8    (,            '  # ?  ,; OF9L  # E L  PQ R J#    K Cest une version revue de larticle qui fut initialement publi dans la collection Fabrizio Speziale lit. grec, est ladjectif qui ds lpoque coloniale saffirma en Inde pour nommer le savoir mdical de source galnique transmis par les mdecins musulmans, dont la vision islamique du monde onirique ont leurs racines dans la tradition prophti- que qui a canonis la fonction spirituelle des rves vridiques pour la commu- Fabrizio Speziale tes, mais sont une condition dont peuvent bnficier tous les musulmans. Les rves vridiques constituent le lien entre Le jour de sa mort, le Prophte a dit: Il ne reste du prophtisme que le bon rve, cf. hirarchie du macrocosme. Les explications de la nature humaine donnes par plusieurs soufis, comme le kubraw-firdaws indien Sharaf al-Dn Maner Fabrizio Speziale Lory 2003:59). Lorigine des visions nocturnes est lie aussi lascension de lesprit humain. Selon une tradition attribue limam Jafar al-Sadiq [m. 765], 11 Le Coran utilise aussi le terme dont il fait un signe divin (XXX, 23), un instru- ment de la direction divine utilis pour guider Fabrizio Speziale longtemps malade sans trouver de remde. Une nuit, il vit en rve son oncle, Khwja Shams al-Dn Mustawf, qui lui recommanda dutiliser un certain m- dicament (vraisemblablement adapt de la pharmacope indienne), qui se trou- vait dans son livre Majma-yi Shams. iy Muammad suivit ces instruc- critiques de la vie, combattre les Du nom de Uways al-Qaran, contemporain du prophte qui na pas rencontr Muam- Fabrizio Speziale sidre comme un signe certain de linspiration divine de sa mission proph- Les sources sur les vies des saints indiens nous indiquent quils taient ga- lement interpells propos de linterprtation des songes, une pratique qui tait Fabrizio Speziale Le sanctuaire le plus clbre pour ces vnements est celui de Khwja Ramat Allh (17031780) Rahmatabad, village proche de Nellore. Khwja Ramat Allh, soufi orthodoxe de lordre naqshband, fonda sa Cf. Malkpr 1913 I:363 sq.; sur Ramat Allh cf. aussi Kokan 1985:82, Bayly 1992:180-1, chisht actif Delhi qui rdigea aussi un commentaire sur luvre mdicale dAvicenne, consiste sasseoir prs de Fabrizio Speziale est un rituel fondamental pour lvocation de lesprit du saint, pour invoquer son au moment den franchir le seuil. Les images du rve Cf. en particulier le tmoignage dtaill du rhteur Aelius Aristide (n. 117), Elio Aris- Fabrizio Speziale homme contemporain de limam qui lui pres Recherche non publie; je remercie vive ment Anne-Sophie Vivier pour ces communi- Le thme de la rencontre avec un saint pr sente des diffrences considrables Fabrizio Speziale quune opration simposait afin de la sauver de la ccit, malgr le risque de dommages irrparables pouvant aussi lamener tre aveugle. La mre de la jeune fille, qui tait originaire du ne ville proche de Rahmatabad, se rendit au sanctuaire de Khwja Ramat Allh. La nui t suivante, elle vit le saint en rve. la tradition islamique. Selon le Coran (XV:27, XXXIV:8) les sont crs Fabrizio Speziale revenus; un jour, il sentit comme lair dun ventilateur lui brlant la peau. Il d- Fabrizio Speziale Selon une biographie rcente en ourdou, le mme Khwja Ramat Allh avait Cependant, ces songes, comme dans le pass, impliquent une confrontation vidente avec le savoir mdical contempor lui fut donne par Sayyid Shh Ala w de Bijapur, qui linitia gale- Le saint voyage donc aussi jusqu la demeure de ses dvots, comme dans le cas dune femme de la famille des descendants de Khwja Mab b Allh Hyderabad. Un jour, elle souffrit de crises de diarrhe, toutes les heures, Al-Bu ir tait affect par une paralysie citant sa Fabrizio Speziale mans, les rves de gurison ne sont pas une prrogative absolue des patients Les modles dominants des rves thrapeutiques des patients des Deccan paraissent surtout figurer des reproductions de thmes du symbolisme Fabrizio Speziale              -        .       2.            (        -     !        - 3.                    . "    #                    $#   %  - '  #         , *  !            +  . "     , / ',  #                    ,       -    ,                *            . 0-              *    - "            -  !    !           -         . "   !            .     -   ,                  ,             !  -        ,     "              !     .        -  ,  5  ,         -     ,   !   !      - "            '  -     !  ! .   5 ,  '     -      !  ! ,   ,    5        ! . 6  5     !   -  ,     ,      5     .   ,    !   5      ,    ,  5  5      5       . 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B @)  5      ,   �  ,   ,     B )      -     , 5     ,        -    B A)    !         # ,     B )   5              -        ,       !     ,  5  5              B ;)  5   (         ! )    -   # ,             -  B 1=)    5         -          ,     B 11)    -                 -    ,                  "  5         ' -      *       , 5  , The late Allamah abab believed that the highest degree of divine unity was the unity whose concept was developed in Islam. According to this concept, the essence of the Real possesses all attributes of perfection and is void of any fault. On the other hand, these attributes of perfection are identical with the es- sence of the Real. The messengers who brought to mankind the religions that preceded Islam invited the people to treat Gods unity in this sense. The teach- ings of the divine sages of Egypt, Greece and Iran also point to Gods unity ex- actly in this sense. By his teaching about the analogical gradation of existence, adr also refers to this kind of unity, because, according to him, both the Nec- essary and the contingents enjoy existence. Therefore, the highest degree of di- Summaries of the Russian Articles ual existences, which effaced the differe Summaries of the Russian Articles first section from adr al-Dn Qnaws , in which the author es-     (           -   ,  #" #     (           - Mashhad University, Iran Janis Esots ( .., .., .. 500 . . 8585. . 9785020365957 ISBN 5-02-036595-5

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